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ABSTRACT
Federal and state laws have long attempted to strike a balance
between protecting patient privacy and health information
confidentiality on the one hand and supporting important uses and
disclosures of health information on the other. To this end, many health
laws restrict the use and disclosure of identifiable health data but
support the use and disclosure of de-identified data. The goal of health
data de-identification is to prevent or minimize informational injuries
to identifiable data subjects while allowing the production of aggregate
statistics that can be used for biomedical and behavioral research,
public health initiatives, informed health care decision making, and
other important activities. Many federal and state laws assume that data
are de-identified when direct and indirect demographic identifiers such
as names, user names, email addresses, street addresses, and telephone
numbers have been removed. An emerging reidentification literature
shows, however, that purportedly de-identified data can—and
increasingly will—be reidentified. This Article responds to this concern
by presenting an original synthesis of illustrative federal and state
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identification and de-identification laws that expressly or potentially
apply to health data; identifying significant weaknesses in these laws in
light of the developing reidentification literature; proposing theoretical
alternatives to outdated identification and de-identification standards,
including alternatives based on the theories of evolving law, nonreidentification, non-collection, non-use, non-disclosure, and nondiscrimination; and offering specific, textual amendments to federal
and state data protection laws that incorporate these theoretical
alternatives.
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INTRODUCTION
Consider a hypothetical involving a woman with a serious mental
health condition. The woman, who wishes to obtain inpatient services
at a nearby psychiatric hospital, provides sensitive health information
to the hospital’s admissions coordinator as part of the intake and
assessment process.1 Assume the woman is subsequently admitted to
the hospital, where she is thoroughly evaluated2 and treated pursuant
to a comprehensive plan of care.3 As required by federal and state law,
substantial information regarding the woman’s history, reasons for
admission, social services, provisional and substantiated diagnoses,
treatments, and progress is documented in her electronic medical
record.4
After ten days of inpatient services,5 the woman has made
sufficient progress such that she is discharged from the hospital and
referred to outpatient care. In accordance with state law, the hospital
electronically discloses significant (although purportedly de-identified)
data regarding the woman to a state health care database that was
created to support research on the cost, utilization, and efficacy of
1. See, e.g., TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 572.0025(h)(3) (West 2021) (defining
“intake” as “the administrative process for gathering information about a prospective [psychiatric
hospital] patient and giving a prospective patient information about the facility and the facility’s
treatment and services”); id. § 572.0025(h)(2) (defining “assessment” as “the administrative
process a facility uses to gather information from a prospective [psychiatric hospital] patient,
including a medical history and the problem for which the patient is seeking treatment, to
determine whether a prospective patient should be examined by a physician to determine if
admission is clinically justified”).
2. See, e.g., 42 C.F.R. § 482.61(b)(1) (2020) (requiring each patient who is admitted to a
Medicare-participating psychiatric hospital to receive a psychiatric evaluation within sixty hours
of admission).
3. See, e.g., id. § 482.61(c)(1)(iii) (requiring each patient who is admitted to a Medicareparticipating psychiatric hospital to have a “comprehensive treatment plan . . . based on . . . the
patient’s strengths and disabilities” and requiring such plan to include the patient’s treatment
modalities).
4. See, e.g., id. § 482.61(a)–(d), (f) (requiring medical records maintained by Medicareparticipating psychiatric hospitals to include substantial data); 26 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 568.101(a) (2021) (requiring medical records maintained by Texas psychiatric hospitals to
include substantial data).
5. See, e.g., Sungkyu Lee, Aileen B. Rothbard & Elizabeth L. Noll, Length of Inpatient Stay
of Persons with Serious Mental Illness: Effects of Hospital and Regional Characteristics, 63 PSYCH.
SERVS. 889, 891–92, 892 fig.1 (2012) (reporting the mean length of psychiatric hospitalization as
ten days).
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health care provided in the state.6 Assume a researcher accesses the
database and reidentifies the woman and other patients with mental
health conditions by matching their data to publicly available
newspaper reports.7 Further assume that a hacker subsequently gains
unauthorized access to the researcher’s reidentified records and makes
them publicly available.8
Independent of its reporting obligations to the state health care
database, assume the hospital also has an arrangement with a
technology company pursuant to which the hospital discloses
supposedly anonymous medical data to the technology company.9
After receiving the data, the technology company uses the data to
create machine learning tools capable of predicting adverse health
outcomes,10 such as heart attacks and strokes. Assume the technology
6. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 9410 (2021) (creating a centralized health-care
database and requiring hospitals and other health-care entities in Vermont to report certain
health-care data to the database).
7. See, e.g., Latanya Sweeney, Only You, Your Doctor, and Many Others May Know,
TECH. SCI. (Sept. 28, 2015), https://techscience.org/a/2015092903 [https://perma.cc/2KSS-MAH4]
(reporting that researchers affiliated with Harvard’s Data Privacy Lab reidentified the subjects of
allegedly de-identified hospital discharge data purchased from the State of Washington for fifty
dollars by matching the data to publicly available newspaper reports).
8. See, e.g., Adil Hussain Seh, Mohammad Zarour, Mamdouh Alenezi, Amal Krishna
Sarkar, Alka Agrawal, Rajeev Kumar & Raees Ahmad Khan, Healthcare Data Breaches: Insights
and Implications, 8 HEALTHCARE 133, 134, 136, 148 (2020) (reporting “the total number of
individuals affected by healthcare data breaches” between 2005 and 2019 (249.09 million),
implying that the healthcare industry has faced the highest number of data breaches among all
industries, finding that hacking is the most prevalent type of healthcare data breach, and defining
hacking to include “malware attack[s], ransomware attack[s], phishing, spyware,” and stolen
data).
9. See, e.g., Class Action Complaint and Demand for a Jury Trial at 2–3, 19–29, Dinerstein
v. Google, LLC, 484 F. Supp. 3d 561 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (No. 1:19-cv-04311) [hereinafter Dinerstein
Lawsuit] (alleging that The University of Chicago Medical Center impermissibly disclosed
hospital data to Google to support Google’s creation of machine learning tools capable of
predicting patients’ future health conditions, and arguing that Google could reidentify the data
subjects by matching their allegedly de-identified data to Google’s proprietary consumer data
obtained through mobile applications such as Google Maps and Waze as well as through internet
protocol addresses tied to individuals’ Google searches), appeal docketed, No. 20-3134 (7th Cir.
Nov. 2, 2020). For an additional example of a data-sharing arrangement between Google and the
health-care industry, see generally Rob Copeland, Google’s ‘Project Nightingale’ Gathers
Personal Health Data on Millions of Americans, WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/
google-s-secret-project-nightingale-gathers-personal-health-data-on-millions-of-americans11573496790 [https://perma.cc/4WDW-4UVR] (last updated Nov. 11, 2019, 4:27 PM), which
reports on a data-sharing relationship between Google and “Ascension, a Catholic chain of 2,600
hospitals, doctors’ offices and other [health-care] facilities.”
10. See, e.g., Dinerstein Lawsuit, supra note 9, at at 2 (explaining Google’s intent to
“partner[] with the University [of Chicago]” to research ways “to use ‘machine learning’ to. . .
predict future medical events”).
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company is able to reidentify the subjects of the medical data by
matching their data to proprietary consumer data in the company’s
possession.11 Further assume that, shortly after the data subjects are
reidentified, a disgruntled company employee makes an unauthorized
disclosure of the reidentified health information.12
This fact pattern is based on recent lawsuits, research studies, and
media reports showing that sensitive, but allegedly de-identified,
health data can be reidentified by large technology companies,13
researchers,14 journalists,15 and interested community members16
through linkage with consumer data, obituary records, and other public
or private data. This Article contends that current data protection laws,
which allow the use and disclosure of de-identified health data without
the prior written authorization of the data subjects,17 insufficiently
protect valuable health data18 and that amending data protection laws
and health status nondiscrimination laws is necessary.
Federal and state laws have long attempted to strike a balance
between protecting patient privacy and confidentiality and supporting
important uses and disclosures of health information.19 To this end,
11. See, e.g., id. at 3 (explaining that Google has in its possession “‘detailed geolocation
information that it can use to pinpoint and match exactly when certain people entered and visited
the University’s hospital’”).
12. See, e.g., Seh et al., supra note 8, at 141 fig.5, 148 (finding that unauthorized internal
disclosures of data are the second most prevalent type of healthcare data breach).
13. See supra note 9.
14. See supra note 7.
15. See, e.g., Khaled El Emam, Fida K. Dankar, Angelica Neisa & Elizabeth Jonker,
Evaluating the Risk of Patient Re-Identification from Adverse Drug Event Reports, BMC MED.
INFORMATICS & DECISION MAKING, Oct. 5, 2013, at 1, 1 [hereinafter El Emam et al., Evaluating
the Risk of Patient Re-Identification] (noting that a national reporter reidentified a deceased
twenty-six-year-old woman from a Canadian adverse drug event database by matching her deidentified database data with publicly available obituary records).
16. See, e.g., Sangchul Park, Gina Jeehyun Choi & Haksoo Ko, Information TechnologyBased Tracing Strategy in Response to COVID-19 in South Korea—Privacy Controversies, 323
JAMA 2129, 2129 (2020) (reporting that members of the South Korean public were able to
reidentify purportedly anonymous COVID-19 data).
17. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.500(a) (2020) (applying the HIPAA Privacy Rule to “protected
health information”); id. § 160.103 (defining “protected health information” as “individually
identifiable health information”); id. § 164.514(a) (stating that de-identified information is not
“individually identifiable health information” and therefore is not protected by the HIPAA
Privacy Rule).
18. See, e.g., Seh et al., supra note 8, at 133 (“Data from the healthcare industry is regarded
as being highly valuable. This has become a major lure for the misappropriation and pilferage of
healthcare data.”).
19. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., OCR PRIVACY BRIEF: SUMMARY OF THE
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1 (2003) (“A major goal of the Privacy Rule is to assure that individuals’
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many health laws restrict the use and disclosure of identifiable health
data but support the use and disclosure of de-identified data.20 The goal
of health data de-identification is to prevent or minimize informational
injuries to identifiable data subjects21 while allowing the production of
aggregate statistics that can be used for biomedical and behavioral
research, public health initiatives, and other important activities.22
Many federal and state laws assume that data are de-identified
when direct and indirect demographic identifiers such as names,
usernames, email addresses, street addresses, and telephone numbers
have been removed.23 The reidentification literature shows, however,

health information is properly protected while allowing the flow of health information needed to
provide and promote high quality health care and to protect the public’s health and well being.”);
Letter from William W. Stead, Chair, Nat’l Comm. on Vital & Health Stat., to Thomas E. Price,
Sec’y, Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs. 1 (Feb. 23, 2017) [hereinafter NCVHS Letter],
https://www.ncvhs.hhs.gov/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/2017-Ltr-Privacy-DeIdentification-Feb23-Final-w-sig.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EDD-FW69] (explaining the “many important uses for deidentified” health data).
20. Compare 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1), (b)(1)(i) (2020) (requiring prior written
authorization from an individual before the individual’s protected health information may be
used or disclosed by certain covered entities), with id. § 164.514(a) (“Health information that does
not identify an individual and with respect to which there is no reasonable basis to believe that
the information can be used to identify an individual is not individually identifiable health
information,” allowing the free use and disclosure of such information), and id. § 164.514(b)(1)–
(2) (setting forth two methods for de-identifying protected health information). See generally
Gregory E. Simon, Susan M. Shortreed, R. Yates Coley, Robert B. Penfold, Rebecca C. Rossom,
Beth E. Waitzfelder, Katherine Sanchez & Frances L. Lynch, Assessing and Minimizing Reidentification Risk in Research Data Derived from Health Care Records, 7 EGEMS, Mar. 29, 2019,
at 1, 2 (explaining that “re-identification of any individual would be a serious breach of trust”).
21. Mehmet Kayaalp, Modes of De-identification, AMIA ANN. SYMP. PROC. 1044, 1044
(2017); see FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC INFORMATIONAL INJURY WORKSHOP 1–3 (2018)
(defining informational injuries as market-based and non-market-based injuries “that
consumers . . . suffer [following] privacy and security incidents, [including] data breaches [and]
unauthorized disclosure[s] of data”); Mark A. Rothstein, Ethical Issues in Big Data Health
Research: Currents in Contemporary Bioethics, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 425, 426–27 (2015)
(discussing physical and dignitary harms associated with “[t]he loss of privacy” in the context of
big data health research when patients are identified or reidentified); Seh et al., supra note 8, at
134 (noting that unauthorized access to healthcare data can lead to “data tampering[, which] can
lead to faulty treatment, [resulting in] fatal and irreversible losses to patients”); NCVHS Letter,
supra note 19, at 10, 12 (explaining that data subject reidentification can “produce[] harm [and]
diminish[] trust” and that “[d]one poorly, de-identification can expose individuals, protected
groups, and establishments to risk of harm to physical well-being, personal dignity, reputation, or
financial position”).
22. NCVHS Letter, supra note 19, at 1; Joshua Rolnick, Aggregate Health Data in the United
States: Steps Toward a Public Good, 19 HEALTH INFORMATICS J. 137, 137–38 (2013).
23. See, e.g., Kayaalp, supra note 21, at 1044 (defining de-identification as “a process of
detecting identifiers (e.g., personal names and social security numbers) that directly or indirectly
point to a person (or entity) and deleting those identifiers from the data”); see infra Part II
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that purportedly de-identified data can—and increasingly will—be
reidentified.24 This Article responds to these concerns and proceeds as
follows. Part I carefully reviews health data reidentification claims and
concerns, providing specific examples of de-identified health data that
were reidentified following matching with other public, semipublic, or
private data.25 Part I also reviews the scientific literature assessing the
risk of reidentification and the efficacy of particular de-identification
techniques to show that health data have a high risk of
reidentification.26 Part II, which is supported by an Appendix,27
presents an original synthesis of illustrative federal and state data
protection laws that expressly or potentially apply to health data,
identifying trends and limitations therein.28 Part II aims to assess
whether federal and state standards for health data identification and
de-identification reflect the reidentification risks and disproportionate
reidentification burdens described in Part I.29 To respond to calls for
data de-identification reform,30 Part III of this Article proposes
theoretical alternatives to current identification and de-identification
standards and implements them in specific textual amendments to
federal and state data protection laws.31 These alternatives are based
on principles of evolving law as well as the concepts of nonreidentification,
noncollection,
nonuse,
nondisclosure,
and
(assessing federal and state standards governing data identification and de-identification and
providing examples of common identifiers).
24. See infra Part I.
25. See infra Part I.A.
26. See infra Part I.B.
27. See Stacey A. Tovino, Not So Private, 71 DUKE L.J. 985, app. (2021),
https://dlj.law.duke.edu/2022/01/appendix-not-so-private/ [https://perma.cc/JSK7-MP72]
[hereinafter Appendix].
28. See infra Part II.
29. See infra Part II.
30. For example, Matthew Fisher wrote,
The one area for attention though is the ability to de-identify protected health
information. . . . [W]hat may no longer be an academic argument is whether data can
truly be de-identified given the plethora that exists and the variety of sets that can be
combined to re-identify information that was previously believed to be completed deidentified. . . . [T]hat line of thinking hints at a gap in HIPAA . . . .
Matthew Fisher, Google-Ascension: Why Is HIPAA Probably Not Being Violated?, HIT
CONSULTANT (Nov. 13, 2019), https://hitconsultant.net/2019/11/13/google-ascension-why-ishipaa-probably-not-being-violated [https://perma.cc/7469-V7TZ]; see also INST. OF MED.,
BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH THROUGH
RESEARCH 190, 265, 281 (Sharyl J. Nass et al. eds., 2009) (calling for legal prohibitions against
the unauthorized reidentification of health data subjects and the imposition of sanctions on such
reidentification).
31. See infra Part III.
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nondiscrimination.32 If adopted by federal and state lawmakers, this
Article’s proposals will protect health data subjects from
discrimination and other injuries associated with the use, disclosure,
and redisclosure of their identifiable—and potentially reidentifiable—
health data.
I. NOT SO PRIVATE
This Part carefully reviews health data reidentification claims and
concerns, providing specific examples of de-identified health data,
including hospital medical record data, hospital discharge data, adverse
drug event data, physical activity data, and infectious disease data, that
were reidentified following matching with other public, semipublic, or
private data.33 This Part also reviews the scientific literature assessing
the risk of reidentification and the efficacy of particular deidentification techniques showing that health data have a high
reidentification risk.34 As discussed below, health data from which as
many as eighteen different identifiers have been removed still carry
some reidentification risk.35 In addition, this reidentification risk is not
shared equally among data subjects.36 Vulnerable individuals, including
those with rare health conditions and members of minority racial and
ethnic groups, bear disproportionate risk.37 Data reidentification is
concerning because of its significant human impact, including
psychological distress, financial injury, loss of trust in the medical
system, stereotyping, stigma, and discrimination.38
A. Reidentification Claims and Concerns
A number of lawsuits, research studies, and media reports show
how the reidentification of health data occurs, including through the
linkage (or matching) of supposedly de-identified health data with

32. See infra Part III.
33. See infra Part I.A.
34. See infra Part I.B.
35. See infra Part I.A.
36. See infra Part I.B.
37. See infra Part I.B.
38. See sources cited supra note 21 (providing examples of injuries suffered by individuals
whose data are reidentified or otherwise breached).
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public, purchasable, or proprietary data.39 Dinerstein v. Google, LLC40
is illustrative.41 On June 26, 2019, plaintiff Matt Dinerstein sued Google
and the University of Chicago Medical Center on behalf of himself and
other patients whose electronic health records (“EHRs”) between
2010 and 2016 were disclosed to Google for predictive health
research.42 Dinerstein alleged several causes of action, including breach
of contract, tortious interference with contract, intrusion upon
seclusion, unjust enrichment, and violations of consumer law.43
These claims stemmed from the Medical Center’s failure to deidentify the EHRs before disclosing them to Google without prior
patient notification or authorization.44 Dinerstein was particularly
worried because he had not one, but two inpatient stays at the Medical
Center.45 During these stays, the hospital collected and recorded
significant data about Dinerstein, including his “vital signs, diagnoses,
procedures, and prescriptions.”46 The hospital also maintained
timestamps indicating the exact date and time Dinerstein visited parts
of the hospital and received certain health-care services.47
In his lawsuit, Dinerstein focuses heavily on the fact that the
EHRs contained timestamps.48 Because Google also obtains precise

39. See, e.g., Simon et al., supra note 20, at 3 (discussing re-identification using public data);
Sweeney, supra note 7, at 2 (discussing re-identification using purchased data); Dinerstein
Lawsuit, supra note 9, at 25 (discussing re-identification using proprietary location data).
40. Dinerstein v. Google, LLC, 484 F. Supp. 3d 561 (N.D. Ill. 2020), appeal docketed, No.
20-3134 (7th Cir. Nov. 2, 2020).
41. See Dinerstein Lawsuit, supra note 9, at 1–4.
42. Id. at 1, 42; Dinerstein, 484 F. Supp. 3d. at 566, 568. Predictive health, sometimes called
predictive modeling or predictive health analytics, is a form of modeling that uses statistical
methods, data mining, and/or game theory to analyze current and historical health data collected
from healthcare providers and/or health insurers. Predictive Analytics in Health Care, DELOITTE
(July 19, 2019), https://www2.deloitte.com/us/en/insights/topics/analytics/predictive-analyticshealth-care-value-risks.html [https://perma.cc/8B26-7VFH]. The goal of predictive health is to
identify the type and timing of future health-care events and prevent such events from occurring.
See Kenneth L. Brigham, Predictive Health: The Imminent Revolution in Health Care, 58 J. AM.
GERIATRICS SOC’Y S298, S298 (2010).
43. Dinerstein Lawsuit, supra note 9, at 41–42.
44. Id. at 19–21, ¶¶ 67, 69–74.
45. Dinerstein, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 566, 570.
46. Id. at 566.
47. Id. at 570, 586; Dinerstein Lawsuit, supra note 9, at 26–27.
48. Dinerstein Lawsuit, supra note 9, at 20–21, ¶¶ 71, 75.
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geolocation data through applications like Google Maps49 and Waze,50
and through IP addresses tied to individuals’ Google searches,51
Dinerstein argued that Google could reidentify him and the other
EHR subjects in violation of their right to privacy.52 Specifically,
Dinerstein argued that Google could match the patients’ timestamp
information to Google’s geolocation data.53
Although Google is a multinational company with a large number
of internet-related services and products that collect considerable
data,54 Google is not uniquely capable of reidentifying health data. A

49. See id. at 24. Google Maps is a mobile application that provides “real-time GPS
navigation, traffic, and transit in[formation]” to individuals located in more than “220 countries
and territories.” See Google Maps, GOOGLE PLAY, https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=
com.google.android.apps.maps [https://perma.cc/MRT6-B36G] (last updated Sept. 30, 2021).
50. See Dinerstein Lawsuit, supra note 9, at 24. Waze is a mobile application that analyzes
community-driven data for the purpose of helping drivers and riders arrive at their destinations
“faster, smoother, safer, and happier.” Waze Carpool, N. ORANGE CNTY. CHAMBER,
https://business.nocchamber.com/list/member/waze-carpool-24774 [https://perma.cc/S2S3-NQBP];
About Us, WAZE, https://www.waze.com/about [https://perma.cc/4JCP-U8SD] (noting that Waze
is a mobile navigation application that analyzes community-driven data).
51. See Dinerstein Lawsuit, supra note 9, at 24. See generally John Herrman, Google Knows
Where You’ve Been, but Does It Know Who You Are?, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 12, 2018),
https://nyti.ms/2NbjeV2 [https://perma.cc/QPG7-W7QW] (citing a report by the Associated
Press, which noted that “[s]ome Google app[lications] automatically store time-stamped location
data without asking”).
52. See Dinerstein Lawsuit, supra note 9, at 23–24, 36 ¶¶ 84–85, 134. The U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois noted,
[F]or a user of Google applications like Mr. Dinerstein, Google can track the specific
University hospital buildings or departments he visited and the time of his visits.
Plaintiff alleges that the combination of such geolocation information and the EHRs,
which include the date and time of hospital services, “creates a perfect formulation of
data points for Google to identify who the patients in those records really are.”
Dinerstein v. Google, LLC, 484 F. Supp. 3d 561, 570 (N.D. Ill. 2020) (citations omitted).
53. Dinerstein Lawsuit, supra note 9, at 28, ¶ 93. See generally Anya E.R. Prince, Location
as Health, HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y (forthcoming), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=3767122 [https://perma.cc/PZ8D-YPAY] (examining how private
companies can use location data “to infer health information” and proposing five data protections
that will help safeguard individuals’ health privacy as identified through location data). On
September 4, 2020, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted the motion
to dismiss Google, The University of Chicago, and The University of Chicago Medical Center on
grounds unrelated to the validity of the plaintiff’s factual reidentification allegations. See
Dinerstein, 484 F. Supp. 3d at 561, 580, 588, 593–95. On November 2, 2020, Dinerstein appealed
this dismissal. Id., appeal docketed, No. 20-3134 (7th Cir. Nov. 2, 2020). As of this writing, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has yet to rule on Dinerstein’s appeal.
54. See Brian X. Chen, It’s Google’s World. We Just Live in It, N.Y. TIMES,
https://nyti.ms/2IPqrIX [https://perma.cc/7DVA-YEPV] (last updated May 3, 2021) (reporting
Google’s dominance as a technology company); Dale Smith, Google Collects a Frightening
Amount of Information About You, CNET.COM (June 28, 2020, 10:18 AM),
https://www.cnet.com/how-to/google-collects-a-frightening-amount-of-data-about-you-you-can-
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small research team affiliated with Harvard University was able to
reidentify the subjects of allegedly de-identified hospital discharge data
purchased from the State of Washington for fifty dollars.55 Although
the data lacked direct patient identifiers, it did have the diagnoses,
medical and surgical procedures, physician names, hospital charges,
payment methods, and ages of patients who received care in
Washington hospitals.56 After linking the hospital data with newspaper
reports of hospitalizations following motor vehicle accidents, assaults,
and events like house fires, thirty-five of eighty-one patients, or 43
percent, were reidentified.57
Lawmakers in other states attributed this study’s success to the
specifics of the Washington database, which contains the discharged
patients’ ages in months, rather than years.58 Accordingly, the
researchers repeated this study using Maine and Vermont hospital
discharge data without patient ages in months.59 Then they ran the
Maine hospital discharge data against 177 local news stories and the
Vermont data against thirty-eight local news stories.60 Of the names
from the 244 names in the 177 local news stories, 28.3 percent
“uniquely matched” a single Maine hospitalization.61 Maine had not
completely de-identified its hospital discharge data in accordance with
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”)
Privacy Rule’s de-identification Safe Harbor,62 an industry standard for
de-identification that requires the removal of eighteen different

find-and-delete-it-now [https://perma.cc/T9F5-6M5X] (describing the vast amounts of data
Google has collected).
55. Sweeney, supra note 7, at 2, 22.
56. Id. at 2, 9–10.
57. Id. at 7, 14, 16. When the Harvard researchers reported their reidentification results to
the State of Washington, the State began restricting public access to its hospital discharge data,
id. at 19, improving patient privacy going forward.
58. Ji Su Yoo, Alexandra Thaler, Latanya Sweeney & Jinyan Zang, Risks to Patient Privacy:
A Re-identification of Patients in Maine and Vermont Statewide Hospital Data, TECH. SCI. (Oct.
9, 2018), https://techscience.org/a/2018100901 [https://perma.cc/75TL-WQ55] (“[M]any states
were not convinced that the same re-identification strategy would be successful on their datasets.
One reason was a belief that Washington State was more vulnerable because it shared patient age
in months, a practice not followed by many other states.”).
59. Id. at 2, 43–44.
60. Id. at 3, 23.
61. Id. at 3.
62. Id. at 21. The Maine discharge data contained the quarter of the year of the patient’s
hospital admission as well as the dates of particular health-care procedures performed. Id. at 4, 7.
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identifiers before information is considered properly de-identified.63
However, when the researchers completely de-identified the Maine
data in accordance with the Safe Harbor, eight matches (a
reidentification rate of 3.2 percent) still resulted.64 As discussed in
more detail in Part II, HIPAA Privacy Rule’s de-identification
standard does not protect against patient reidentification.
With respect to the Vermont hospital discharge data, the
researchers found that of the names from the forty-seven local news
stories, 34 percent uniquely matched to one hospitalization.65 When the
Vermont hospital discharge data were completely de-identified in
accordance “with the HIPAA Safe Harbor . . . , five matches” (a 10.6
percent reidentification rate) still resulted.66 The researchers
concluded: “[P]atients’ personal information is vulnerable to reidentification even when hospital data is de-identified according to
HIPAA Safe Harbor guidelines.”67 They also “call[ed] for more
rigorous inquiry on the vulnerabilities that exist even when following
HIPAA Safe Harbor as a standard for de-identification.”68
Researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, the
University of California, Berkeley, Tsinghua University, and the
University of California, San Francisco, used machine learning69 to
reidentify 95 percent and 94 percent of the adult subjects and 87
percent and 86 percent of the minor subjects whose allegedly deidentified physical activity data were collected from wearable devices
as part of National Health and Nutrition Examination Surveys in 2003

63. Id. at 4 (stating, “[T]he Safe Harbor de-identification guidelines are still widely
recognized as a standard for de-identifying all kinds of health data”); see infra Part II.B.2
(assessing the HIPAA Safe Harbor). The HIPAA Safe Harbor requires the removal of all
elements of dates other than year. The regulations require removing
[a]ll elements of dates (except year) for dates directly related to an individual, including
birth date, admission date, discharge date, date of death; and all ages over 89 and all
elements of dates (including year) indicative of such age, except that such ages and
elements may be aggregated into a single category of age 90 or older.
45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(C) (2020).
64. Ji Su Yoo et al., supra note 58, at 3.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Machine learning, a subset of artificial intelligence, is the scientific study of algorithms
and statistical models that computer systems use to perform specific tasks without using explicit
instructions and by relying on patterns and inference instead. See generally Rahul C. Deo,
Machine Learning in Medicine, 132 CIRCULATION 1920 (2015) (summarizing applications of
machine learning in medicine).
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through 2004 and 2005 through 2006, respectively.70 Although
wearable device manufacturers such as Fitbit71 and Strava72 have long
maintained that collecting and disclosing de-identified physical activity
data do not raise privacy concerns, this study suggests otherwise.73
Journalists and news reporters also have succeeded in
reidentifying health data. In Canada, a national broadcaster
reidentified a deceased twenty-six-year-old woman whose deidentified data had been disclosed to a Canadian adverse drug event
(“ADE”) database after her drug-associated death.74 The broadcaster
matched her de-identified ADE data with publicly available obituary
data.75 The broadcaster then obtained additional information about the
woman, contacted the woman’s family, and released a story that used
the woman to illustrate the adverse effects of the drug at issue.76 The
woman’s parents thus lost the ability to keep the nature and cause of
their daughter’s death private.
Even lay community members have reidentified the subjects of
supposedly anonymous health data. In the Republic of Korea, citizens
with COVID-19 were quickly reidentified77 after the South Korean

70. Liangyuan Na, Cong Yang, Chi-Cheng Lo, Fangyuan Zhao, Yoshimi Fukuoka & Anil
Aswani, Feasibility of Reidentifying Individuals in Large National Physical Activity Data Sets from
Which Protected Health Information Has Been Removed with Use of Machine Learning, 1 JAMA
NETWORK OPEN, Dec. 21, 2018, at 1, 2–3, 9 (using machine learning to demonstrate the
“[f]easibility of [r]eidentifying [i]ndividuals in . . . [p]hysical [a]ctivity [d]ata . . . [f]rom [w]hich
[p]rotected [h]ealth [i]nformation [h]as [b]een [r]emoved.”).
71. See Fitbit Privacy Policy, FITBIT, https://www.fitbit.com/global/us/legal/privacy-policy
[https://perma.cc/ZG7U-49NJ] (last updated Aug. 16, 2021) (“We may share non-personal
information that is aggregated or de-identified so that it cannot reasonably be used to identify an
individual.”).
72. See
Strava
Privacy
Policy,
STRAVA,
https://www.strava.com/legal/privacy
[https://perma.cc/EC2G-S7TV] (“Information connected to you that is no longer necessary and
relevant to provide our Services may be de-identified or aggregated with other non-personal data
to provide insights which are commercially valuable to Strava, such as statistics of the use of the
Services.”).
73. See Na et al., supra note 70, at 1 (“The findings of this study suggest that current practices
for deidentifying physical activity data are insufficient for privacy and that deidentification should
aggregate the physical activity data of many people to ensure individuals’ privacy.”).
74. KHALED EL EMAM, GUIDE TO THE DE-IDENTIFICATION OF PERSONAL HEALTH
INFORMATION 6 (2013) (reporting the story of the young woman’s reidentification).
75. El Emam et al., Evaluating the Risk of Patient Re-Identification, supra note 15, at 1
(reporting the same story).
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Park et al., supra note 16, at 2129 (“Some of these individuals were affected by
unwanted privacy invasion and even became subject to public disdain.”).
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government publicized anonymous78 data that included the citizens’
“sex, nationality, and age.”79 Community members then linked the
anonymous data with other data provided by local governments,
including “detailed routes [traveled by infected persons] as well as the
names of restaurants, shops, and other business premises that infected
persons visited.”80
In the United States, COVID-19 contact tracing and exposure
notification have raised similar concerns.81 Consider Google and
Apple’s jointly developed Exposure Notifications System (“ENS”),
which uses mobile devices’ Bluetooth technology to track users’
proximity to other users who test positive for COVID-19.82 Although
Google and Apple claim that ENS user privacy is protected,83 critics
worry that users’ COVID-19 data could be disclosed to government

78. Anonymous data do not include the data subjects’ names. See, e.g., Anonymous,
OXFORD LEARNER’S DICTIONARIES, https://www.oxfordlearnersdictionaries.com/us/definition/
english/anonymous. [https://perma.cc/5L46-K85E] (defining anonymous as “(of a person) with a
name that is not known or that is not made public”).
79. In their article published in JAMA, Park, Choi, and Ko state that
[t]he current [public] disclosures on the [South Korean Ministry of Health and Welfare]
home page include, in addition to [the path and means of transportation of infected
persons, the medical institutions that treated infected persons, and the health status of
those in contact with an infected person], the sex, nationality, and age of infected
persons, although their names are not revealed. Certain municipal and local
governments, however, went further and provided highly detailed routes as well as the
names of restaurants, shops, and other business premises that infected persons visited.
Park et al., supra note 16, at 2129.
80. Id.
81. See generally I. Glenn Cohen, Lawrence O. Gostin & Daniel J. Weitzner, Digital
Smartphone Tracking for COVID-19: Public Health and Civil Liberties in Tension, 323 JAMA
2371 (2020) (asking whether COVID-19 digital tracking “confer[s] sufficient public health benefit
to justify adoption given privacy concerns” and arguing that “[w]idespread deployment would
only be warranted if” public health efficacy balanced favorably against “privacy and other costs”).
82. See Apple & Google, Exposure Notifications: Help Slow the Spread of COVID-19, with
One Step on Your Phone, GOOGLE: COVID-19 INFO. & RES., https://www.google.com/covid19/
exposurenotifications [https://perma.cc/UY5A-FL3U] (“We understand how important your
privacy is. Here’s how we’ve built this system to respect your privacy and keep you in control.”).
83. See
Apple
&
Google,
Privacy-Preserving
Contact
Tracing,
APPLE,
https://covid19.apple.com/contacttracing [https://perma.cc/WM3R-JTB7] (referring to their
technology solution as “privacy-preserving contact tracing”); APPLE & GOOGLE, EXPOSURE
NOTIFICATION: BLUETOOTH SPECIFICATION 8 (2020) (“Maintaining user privacy is an essential
requirement in the design of this specification.”); Jack Nicas & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Apple and
Google Team Up To ʻContact Traceʼ the Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/
2020/04/10/technology/apple-google-coronavirus-contact-tracing.html [https://perma.cc/R94LS2YD] (last updated June 3, 2020) (“Apple and Google said they were discussing how much
information to include in those [COVID-19 contact tracing] alerts with health officials, aiming to
strike a balance between being helpful while also protecting the privacy of those who have the
coronavirus.”).
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agencies, insurers, marketing companies, data brokers,
cybercriminals for purposes unrelated to public health.84

999
and

B. Research Assessing Reidentification Risk
A growing scientific literature aims to calculate the risk of health
data reidentification as well as the efficacy of particular data deidentification and data perturbation methods.85 In 2011, researchers
affiliated with the CHEO Research Institute, the University of Ottawa,
and Vanderbilt University systematically reviewed the “statistics,
computer science, and health informatics” literature to locate data
reidentification attacks and to determine the portion of data correctly

84. See, e.g., Editorial, Privacy Cannot Be a Casualty of the Coronavirus, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
7, 2020), https://nyti.ms/2XiIwnG [https://perma.cc/PC2T-DNRB] (“Americans have lost control
over a lot as a result of the coronavirus. At least they should be able to control what happens to
their personal data.”); Daniel R. Stoller & Lydia Wheeler, Apple-Google Virus Tracking Plan
Carries Data Security Risks, BLOOMBERG L. NEWS (Apr. 16, 2020, 5:46 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-security/apple-google-virus-tracking-plancarries-data-security-risks [https://perma.cc/J86Y-BRLG] (reporting, in the context of COVID19 cell-phone tracking, that “[c]ybercriminals might be able to tie the anonymized private data
back to specific individuals, including corporate and government officials,” “[s]ometimes
anonymized data isn’t a ‘silver bullet’ to guard information, because it can be combined with data
on social media and other online records,” and “Apple and Google could also face federal and
state regulatory scrutiny if data is breached and is not properly de-identified”); Ben Brody &
Naomi Nix, Pandemic Data-Sharing Puts New Pressure on Privacy Protections, BLOOMBERG L.
NEWS (Apr. 5, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberglawnews/health-lawand-business/XDR76Q5G000000 [perma.cc/YFU7-UNNB] (“The sources of anonymous data
can sometimes be exposed by combining datasets. Even when made anonymous, location points
that come from phone apps, for instance, can be linked to a person by checking who lives at the
address where the phone rests at night.”); Shira Stein & Daniel R. Stoller, NIH in Pursuit of
Privacy-Protected
Contact
Tracing
Tool
(1),
BLOOMBERG
L.
NEWS,
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/blaw/bloomberglawnews/health-law-and-business/
[https://perma.cc/35SF-TCCS] (last updated May 27, 2020, 1:09 PM) (“An NIH-backed
smartphone app could still raise privacy concerns even if it de-identifies or anonymizes the data
it collects. Advocates and researchers have shown that such data can be traced back to individuals
if not done properly, undercutting any privacy protections that may be built into the
application.”). See generally Clarisa Long, Privacy and Pandemics, in LAW IN THE TIME OF
COVID-19, at 89 (Katharina Pistor ed., 2020) (discussing a range of privacy issues raised by the
COVID-19 pandemic).
85. See generally Nikunjkumar Patel, Data Mining: Privacy Preservation Using Perturbation
Technique 12 (May 6, 2015) (M.S. Thesis, SUNY Polytechnic Institute),
https://dspace.sunyconnect.suny.edu/bitstream/handle/1951/67640/NPatel-Final.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/ZM5S-CUTQ] (identifying and discussing data perturbation techniques, including
“random noise addition methods, rotation perturbation, projection perturbation and kanonymization model”).
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reidentified in those attacks.86 The researchers identified fourteen
distinct reidentification attacks and found that 26 percent of the
attacked records (and 34 percent of the attacked health records) were
successfully reidentified.87 This evidence revealed a “high” rate of data
reidentification.88
Two years later, a subset of the same University of Ottawa
researchers published a second study assessing “the risk of patient
re[]identification” in Canada’s ADE database.89 In particular, the
Ottawa researchers developed and tested an updated reidentification
risk model that was designed to mimic the behaviors of realistic
reidentifiers, called adversaries, who were mildly or highly motivated
to verify potentially successful data matches.90 The researchers then
applied their model to the risk of reidentifying ADE data.91 Due to the
public availability of mortality data (which could serve as a link to
allegedly de-identified ADE data containing the date of the death
report, which might be close to the date of death), the researchers
focused specifically on the risk of reidentifying ADE data of druginduced deaths.92
For mildly motivated adversaries, the risk of reidentification
following the ADE database’s disclosure of a patient’s province, age at
death, gender, and exact date of ADE report was high, at 18.44 to 30.78
percent, although removing the patient’s province reduced the risk
significantly to 1.95 to 5.05 percent.93 The risk of reidentification was
lower still at 0.21 to 0.63 percent if the ADE database only disclosed
the month and year (versus the precise date) of the ADE report, even

86. Khaled El Emam, Elizabeth Jonker, Luk Arbuckle & Bradley Malin, A Systematic
Review of Re-Identification Attacks on Health Data, PLOS ONE, Dec. 2, 2011, at 1, 2 [hereinafter
El Emam et al., A Systematic Review].
87. Id. at 1, 5, 7.
88. Id. at 1, 7.
89. See El Emam et al., Evaluating the Risk of Patient Re-Identification, supra note 15, at 1.
See generally Canada Vigilance Adverse Reaction Online Database, GOV’T OF CAN.,
https://www.canada.ca/en/health-canada/services/drugs-health-products/medeffect-canada/adversereaction-database.html [https://perma.cc/Y86V-2V2F] (last updated Sept. 1, 2021) (providing
information about Canada Vigilance, formerly named CADRIS).
90. El Emam et al., Evaluating the Risk of Patient Re-Identification, supra note 15, at 1, 4–8
(describing the difference in the identification verification efforts of mildly versus highly
motivated adversaries, explaining how adversaries can verify potential matches, and explaining
the necessity of the researchers’ model).
91. Id. at 8–9.
92. Id. at 8–10.
93. Id. at 9–10.
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if all other data, including province, were disclosed.94 For highly
motivated adversaries, all ADE records had a high risk of
reidentification, “but the plausibility of that scenario is limited because
of the financial and practical deterrent even for highly motivated
adversaries.”95
Based on this, the researchers did not object to disclosing the
ADE’s province field, but did object to disclosing the date of the death
report of the individuals reported to the database.96 The researchers
also recommended that: (1) “the public . . . be discouraged from
[sharing] personal information”; (2) “commercial and government[al]
organizations . . . be discouraged from collecting non-required
personal information”; and (3) “data custodians . . . generalize their
data to increase the costs of verification for an adversary.”97
Although the Ottawa research shows that data containing indirect
patient demographic identifiers (such as province, age at death, and
gender) risk reidentification, few studies have assessed reidentification
risk for data containing no direct or indirect demographic identifiers.
Aware of this gap, a group of Vanderbilt Department of Biomedical
Informatics researchers investigated reidentification risk for data in
which only clinical features, such as standardized diagnostic codes,
remained.98 In particular, the researchers investigated the feasibility of
linking otherwise de-identified electronic medical records from a
population of 1,174,793 Vanderbilt University Medical Center patients
that contained standardized diagnostic codes with external data
deposited into the DataBase of Genotypes and Phenotypes containing
the same diagnostic codes.99 An example of a standardized diagnosis
code is “ICD 493.00,” which is the former International Classification
of Diseases (“ICD”) diagnostic code for a type of asthma.100
The Vanderbilt researchers then measured the likelihood of
linking the Vanderbilt medical records with the External Data based
94. Id. at 10.
95. Id. at 1, 10.
96. Id. at 10–11.
97. Id. at 11.
98. See Grigorios Loukides, Joshua C. Denny & Bradley Malin, The Disclosure of Diagnosis
Codes Can Breach Research Participants’ Privacy, 17 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 322, 322
(2010) (“To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first to illustrate that clinical features
released in the form of standardized codes can also facilitate privacy violations.”).
99. See id. at 322–24.
100. See id. at 323 (using this diagnostic code example in Figure 1); 2012 ICD-9-CM Diagnosis
Code 493.0: Extrinsic Asthma, ICD9DATA.COM, http://www.icd9data.com/2012/Volume1/460519/490-496/493/493.0.htm [https://perma.cc/XC8W-VJ8U].
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on standardized diagnostic codes in two scenarios: (1) when “no
[reidentification] protecti[ve] measures [were] applied and (2)” when
the data “perturbation101 techniques of suppression” (i.e., “the removal
of patient records or particular quasi-identifier values”) and
generalization (i.e., “the replacement of quasi-identifier values with
more general, but semantically consistent values”) were applied.102
The researchers found that when five-digit ICD codes were used
without any perturbation techniques, the reidentification risk was very
high—a full 96 percent.103 After suppressing all rare ICD codes104 (i.e.,
“ICD-9 codes that appeared in at most 5%, 15%[,] and 25% of
transactions”),105 the researchers found that the reidentification risk
was still 75 percent and 26 percent (applying “the 5% and 15%
suppression threshold[s],” respectively).106 The threshold at which no
Vanderbilt Medical Record subject could be reidentified was 25
percent.107 When the researchers tried generalizing the ICD codes “to
their three-digit representation,” there was a privacy gain of less than
2 percent.108
“[T]he re[]identification of patient-specific data through
standardized [diagnostic codes] is a practical privacy threat”109 because
“the majority of patients’ diagnosis codes are unique not only within
the sample, but also with respect to the larger population of the 1.2
million patients from which they were derived.”110 The researchers
concluded that “neither suppression of rare codes (a requirement of
the HIPAA [Safe Harbor] privacy rule), nor generalization,
sufficiently protects records while retaining clinically meaningful

101. In this context, data perturbation is “the changing of patient-specific quasi-identifier
values.” Loukides et al., supra note 98, at 323.
102. Id. at 323–24.
103. See id. at 325 (“Notice that, over 96% of patients are vulnerable to re-identification when
no perturbation is invoked. The attack may thus be successful in practice.”).
104. An example of a rare ICD code would be the ICD code (G31.01) for Pick’s disease, 2022
ICD-10-CM
Diagnosis
Code
G31.01:
Pick’s
Disease,
ICD10DATA.COM,
https://www.icd10data.com/ICD10CM/Codes/G00-G99/G30-G32/G31-/G31.01 [https://perma.cc/
8FDN-HS8E], which is a rare form of dementia. Pick’s Disease, PENN MED.,
https://www.pennmedicine.org/for-patients-and-visitors/patient-information/conditions-treateda-to-z/picks-disease [https://perma.cc/H7CD-DSPS].
105. Loukides et al., supra note 98, at 325.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 327.
110. Id. at 322–23.
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information.”111 Parts II and III will discuss the implications of these
conclusions for the effectiveness of federal and state data identification
and de-identification law.112
Finally, health researchers affiliated with Kaiser Permanente,113
HealthPartners Institute, and Baylor Scott and White Research
Institute describe a “framework for assessing [data reidentification]
risk.”114 The risk of reidentifying the subject of a particular health
record or other sensitive record depends on three factors: (1) the
availability of public or other data115 containing one or more elements
that overlap with the sensitive record; (2) “the size of the class defined
by those overlapping elements in which the [particular sensitive] record
. . . falls;” and (3) “the overlap in the population covered by the
[sensitive records] and the population covered by the external data
source.”116
For example, the reidentification risk is higher if “the population
covered by [the] external data source” (e.g., a single state’s motor
vehicle crash database) is “congruent or completely overlapping” with
the population covered by the health or other sensitive record set (e.g.,
the same state’s “all-payer insurance claims database”).117 The
reidentification risk is lower if a single state motor vehicle crash
database represents a subset consisting of one particular insurer’s
claims in a state that licenses a number of other insurers.118 The
reidentification risk is lower still if the two data sources cover partially
overlapping populations.119 For example, consider a single state’s
motor vehicle crash database that is linked to the insurance claims
111. Id. at 327; see also id. at 323 (“[P]opular techniques, such as suppression and
generalization, fail to prevent re-identifying patients, or excessively distort the released
information to the point that it loses its clinical utility for GWAS [(genome-wide association
studies)].”).
112. See infra Parts II, III.
113. “Kaiser Permanente is one of the nation’s largest not-for-profit health plans, serving 12.5
million
members.”
Fast
Facts:
Our
Company,
KAISER
PERMANENTE,
https://about.kaiserpermanente.org/who-we-are/fast-facts [https://perma.cc/4NB8-47DW].
114. See Simon et al., supra note 20, at 1.
115. Examples of external data include consumer location data (such as that referenced in
Dinerstein v. Google, LLC), hospital discharge data (such as that referenced in the Harvard
University studies), and public obituary data (such as that referenced in the Canadian national
broadcaster reidentification example). See supra Part I.A (discussing these cases, studies, and
anecdotes).
116. Simon et al., supra note 20, at 3–4.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 4.
119. Id.
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records of a single insurer that insures only “[one] in [five state]
residents in a [three]-state area.”120
Given this, the researchers offered three steps for data stewards to
follow to assess the risk of reidentification of a sensitive but
purportedly de-identified record set, such as a health record set.121
“First, a data steward should consider the range of external data
sources containing overlapping data elements as well as explicit
identifiers.”122 “Second, a data steward should examine the prevalence
of unique or nearly unique records defined by those overlapping data
elements.”123 The researchers offered the example of a sensitive, but
purportedly de-identified, suicide risk prediction (“SRP”) research
dataset that had a number of data elements that overlapped with
publicly available mortality records, including sex, age group range,
race, “Hispanic ethnicity, calendar year of death, and” category of
death (e.g., overdose).124 “[U]nique or nearly unique records”125 could
then be suppressed.126 “Third, a data steward should consider the likely
pattern of population overlap with identified external data sources.”127
“If[, for example,] the population covered by the [health data] overlaps
completely with that covered by an external data source, then each cell
. . . in the [health] research database [could] be completely linked to
the corresponding cell . . . in the [identifiable,] external data[
source].”128 The researchers then illustrated the application of their
three steps to an allegedly de-identified SRP research dataset “to
estimate re[]identification risk” following linkage with external data in
a publicly available state mortality database.129 In particular, common
data elements, like “Hispanic females aged 13–17 dying in 2012 in
Washington state by overdose judged to have undetermined intent,”
“identified only [three] individuals in the” allegedly de-identified SRP
dataset.130 Assuming that Kaiser Permanente provides health insurance
to one-fifth of the State of Washington, “then those three records in

120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2, 5.
Nearly unique records have some overlapping data elements.
See id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6.
Id.
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the research dataset would match . . . an estimated [fifteen] recordsin
the Washington state mortality data[set].”131 Thus, someone with both
the sensitive SRP data and the public mortality data could find fifteen
records in the SRP data and know that a specific person is among those
fifteen.132
The researchers then offered measures designed to prevent
reidentification, including whole record deletion and alteration of
certain values within a record,133 such as the patient’s health system or
state. However, such measures could reduce the dataset’s value for
suicide prevention research or another publicly beneficial activity.134
This is because the less that is known about a patient, the less is known
about why the patient committed suicide and the less valuable the data
are for predicting or preventing future suicides.
The researchers emphasized that the “risk of re[]identification
does not fall equally among all people included in a research
dataset.”135 “Instead[,] it falls largely or exclusively on those in small
cells or classes, usually defined by demographic or health-related
characteristics,” such as “vulnerable or traditionally disadvantaged
groups, including people with rarer health conditions and members of
minority racial or ethnic groups.”136 Therefore, they recommended that
disproportionate reidentification burdens be considered alongside the
benefits traditionally associated with including members of vulnerable
populations in research.137
Part I has carefully reviewed health data reidentification claims
and concerns, providing specific examples of de-identified health data
that were reidentified following matching with public, semipublic, or
private data. This Part has also reviewed illustrative studies
investigating the risk of reidentification and the efficacy of particular
de-identification or perturbation techniques. Four conclusions may be
drawn from this Part. First, health data have a high risk of

131. Id.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 8.
136. Id.
137. Id.; see also Heng Xu & Nan Zhang, Implications of Data Anonymization on the
Statistical Evidence of Disparity, INFORMS PUBSONLINE, June 4, 2021, at 1, 2 (asking “whether
data anonymization could mask gross statistical disparities between [vulnerable] subpopulations
in the data,” masking health disparities associated with “gender, race, ethnicity, income, [and]
sexual orientation” (emphasis omitted)).
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reidentification.138 Second, health data from which as many as eighteen
different identifiers have been removed still carry some risk of
reidentification.139 Third, the suppression of rare data elements and the
generalization of other data elements—two approaches followed by
some data protection laws—may be insufficient to prevent
reidentification.140 Finally, the risk of reidentification is not shared
equally by data subjects.141 Vulnerable individuals, including
individuals with rare health conditions and individuals who are
“members of minority racial [and] ethnic groups,” may bear a
disproportionate burden of reidentification.142 Part II, below, assesses
whether current federal and state data protection laws reflect—and
respond to—these findings.
II. THE LAW OF (DE)IDENTIFICATION
A number of current and pending federal and state data
protection laws expressly or potentially protect patient privacy, health
information confidentiality, or health data security, and/or require
notification of health data subjects in the event of a privacy or security
breach.143 As discussed below, these laws contain a wide variety of
138. See, e.g., supra notes 57, 61, 65, 70, 87, 93, 103 and accompanying text (reporting rates of
health data reidentification from particular studies).
139. As discussed in more detail at infra Part II.B.2, the HIPAA Safe Harbor requires a
HIPAA-covered data steward to remove eighteen different direct and indirect identifiers relating
to a patient (or the patient’s relatives, employers, or household members) from the information
in order for the information to be considered de-identified. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(A)–
(R) (2020) (listing the eighteen identifiers). As discussed at supra notes 64 and 66 and
accompanying text, however, reidentification rates as high as 10.6 percent have been found with
respect to data that has been de-identified in accordance with the HIPAA Safe Harbor.
140. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
141. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 135–137 and accompanying text.
143. The Appendix collects, and this Article originally synthesizes, a wide range of
illustrative, current and pending, federal and state authorities that expressly or potentially protect
the confidentiality and security of health data as well as the privacy of individuals who are the
subjects of such data. Illustrative, not exhaustive, examples of health data protected by these
authorities include general medical record data, see, e.g., Appendix at Montana-2, Texas-2,
HIPAA, infectious disease data, see, e.g., Appendix at ENPA, PHEPA, health, fitness, or
kinesthetic data, see, e.g., Appendix at SMARTWATCH Data Act, genetic data, see, e.g.,
Appendix at District of Columbia, Maryland, CCDPA, biometric data, see, e.g., Appendix at
DCA, HIPAA, PHEPA, and, importantly, general consumer data from which an individual’s
health data can be inferred, see, e.g., Appendix at California-2, CalOPPA, MYOBA. This Article:
(1) pinpoints the identification and de-identification standards within these illustrative
authorities; (2) assesses the standards’ strengths and weaknesses in light of the data
reidentification literature; (3) shows how current and even pending standards for data
identification and de-identification are insufficient to protect against reidentification; and (4)
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approaches to health data identification—through legal protection—
and health data de-identification—through deregulation. Most, if not
all, of these standards insufficiently protect against reidentification.
A. Identification Standards
Most data protection laws begin by identifying the individuals and
institutions that must comply with the law (sometimes called “covered
entities”144) and the class or classes of data that are protected by the
law (sometimes called “personal information,” “sensitive personally
identifying information,” or “protected health information”).145 With
respect to the protected classes of data, most data protection laws
require information to relate to a particular individual—to be
individually identifiable before the data will receive legal protection.146
Stated another way, how a data protection law clarifies which data
relate to a particular individual will affect whether the data receive

proposes illustrative changes to these standards. Beyond the focus of this Article are: (1) federal
and state authorities that focus solely on non-health-related data where health data cannot be
inferred, such as financial data, bank data, education data, tax or payroll data, criminal data,
property data, telephone record data, or utility services data; and (2) federal and state
professional and institutional certification and licensing authorities applicable to a wide range of
health industry participants that may be preempted by the HIPAA Privacy Rule because they are
not as stringent as the HIPAA Privacy Rule and/or that may not contain particular identification
or de-identification standards.
144. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.102(a), 160.103 (2020) (applying the HIPAA Privacy Rule to
certain “covered entities,” defined to include health plans, health-care clearinghouses, and those
“health care provider[s] who transmit[] . . . health information in electronic form in connection
with [standard] transaction[s]”); ALA. CODE § 8-38-2(2) (2021) (applying the Alabama Data
Breach Notification Act to certain “covered entit[ies],” defined to include “[a] person, sole
proprietorship, partnership, government entity, corporation, nonprofit, trust, estate, cooperative
association, or other business entity that acquires or uses sensitive personally identifying
information”). The question of who must comply with federal and state data protection laws was
the focus of the Author’s prior work. See Stacey A. Tovino, Going Rogue: Mobile Research
Applications and the Right to Privacy, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 155, 174–76 nn.108–23 (2019)
(showing that many technology companies, citizen scientists, independent scientists, mobile
health applications, and mobile research applications that collect, use, and/or disclose health data
are not regulated by the HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules, although other data protection laws
may apply).
145. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(g) (2021) (applying protections to “personal
information”); ALA. CODE § 8-38-2(6) (2021) (applying protections to “sensitive personally
identifying information”); 45 C.F.R. § 164.500(a) (2020) (applying the protections set forth in the
HIPAA Privacy Rule to “protected health information”).
146. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-103(5) (2021) (defining “[m]edical information” as
“individually identifiable information” (emphasis added)); 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining
“[p]rotected health information,” in relevant part, as “individually identifiable health
information” (emphasis added)).
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legal protection.147 This Article refers to this clarification as a data
identification standard.
Data protection laws incorporate a wide variety of data
identification standards, including “reasonable basis to believe”
standards, “capable (or reasonably capable) of being associated”
standards, “linked (or reasonably linkable)” standards, “sufficient to
perform identity theft” standards, “first name or first initial and last
name” standards, “name, username, or email address plus password”
standards, and “multiple data element” standards. Because a lack of
identifiability, or initial legal protection, has the same end result as deidentification, or the loss of legal protection, identification standards
must be assessed together with de-identification standards.
1. “Reasonable Basis to Believe” Standards. A number of data
protection laws protect health data if there is a “reasonable basis to
believe” that the data subject can be identified from the data. For
example, the federal HIPAA Privacy Rule,148 which regulates certain
covered entities149 and business associates150 when using or disclosing
protected health information (“PHI”),151 contains a “reasonable basis

147. These legal protections can take the form of a requirement for prior written
authorization from the health data subject before the subject’s information can be used or
disclosed. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.508(a)(1), (b)(1)(i), (c)(1)(vi) (2020) (requiring a covered
entity to obtain the prior written authorization of the individual who is the subject of the
information (or the individual’s legally authorized representative) before using the individual’s
information for certain activities). These legal protections can also take the form of
administrative, physical, and technical safeguards (i.e., security standards) that must be
implemented to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the health data. See, e.g.,
id. §§ 164.308, 164.310, 164.312 (requiring covered entities to implement administrative, physical,
and technical data safeguards). These legal protections also include breach notification standards;
that is, patient notification and protection procedures that must be followed in the event of a
privacy or security breach. See, e.g., D.C. CODE § 28-3852 (2021) (requiring notification of
Washington, D.C., residents whose personal information is part of a security system breach).
148. The HIPAA Privacy Rule is codified at 45 C.F.R. Part 164, Subpart E. See 45 C.F.R.
§§ 164.500–164.534 (2020).
149. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining “[c]overed entity” to include health plans, health care
clearinghouses, and “health care provider[s] who transmit[] health information in electronic form
in connection with a [standard] transaction”); id. § 160.102(a) (applying the HIPAA Rules to
covered entities).
150. See id. § 160.103 (defining business associate); id. § 160.102(b) (applying the HIPAA
Rules to business associates).
151. Id. § 160.103 (defining protected health information (“PHI”)); id. (defining
“[i]ndividually identifiable health information” as “a subset of health information” that “[i]s
created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or health care
clearinghouse” and that “[r]elates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or
condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the past, present, or
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to believe” identification standard. Among other avenues, information
is PHI under the HIPAA Privacy Rule if there is a “reasonable basis
to believe” the information can be used to identify the individual.152
The federal Protecting Personal Health Data Act (“PPHDA”)
similarly protects information “with respect to which there is a
reasonable basis to believe that the information can be used to identify
the individual.”153 Some states that extended the HIPAA Privacy
Rule’s protections to non-HIPAA covered entities154 also follow the
“reasonable basis to believe” standard. For example, the Texas
Medical Records Privacy Act (“TMRPA”) offers legal protections to
“protected health information,” internally referencing the HIPAA
Privacy Rule.155
Of note, neither the HIPAA Privacy Rule, the PPHDA, nor the
TMRPA specifies the identifiers that must be present before a

future payment for the provision of health care to an individual” and that either (i) “identifies the
individual” or (ii) “[w]ith respect to which there is a reasonable basis to believe the information
can be used to identify the individual”); id. (listing the four exclusions from the definition of PHI).
152. See id. (defining individually identifiable health information); id. § 164.514(a) (“Health
information that does not identify an individual and with respect to which there is no reasonable
basis to believe that the information can be used to identify an individual is not individually
identifiable health information.”); Appendix at HIPAA.
153. Protecting Personal Health Data Act, S. 24, 117th Cong. § 3(5) (2021); Appendix at
PPHDA. Senator Amy Klobuchar introduced the PPHDA on June 13, 2019. S.24 - Protecting
Personal Health Data Act, CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senatebill/24 [https://perma.cc/UGM2-Q3VH]. The PPHDA would direct the Secretary of the U.S.
Department of Health and Human Services to promulgate regulations that would “strengthen
privacy and security protections for . . . personal health data that [are] collected, processed,
analyzed, or used by consumer devices, services, applications, and software.” S. 24, § 4; Appendix
at PPHDA. The PPHDA did not become law.
154. Although the HIPAA Administrative Simplification provisions and the privacy and
security regulations adopted thereunder regulate covered entities and business associates thereof,
these provisions do not constrain non-covered entities and non-business associates, including
many technology companies, online service providers, mobile health applications, mobile
research applications, and other individuals and institutions that collect, create, use, disclose, and
redisclose health data. See Tovino, supra note 144, at 174–76 nn.108–23 (showing that many
technology companies, citizen scientists, independent scientists, mobile health applications, and
mobile research applications that collect, use, and/or disclose health data are not regulated by the
HIPAA Privacy and Security Rules). As a result, some states have adopted HIPAA-like
provisions, but have applied these provisions to a broader range of covered entities, including any
person who “comes into possession of protected health information” as well as any person who
“obtains or stores protected health information.” See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 181.001(b)(2)(B)–(C) (West 2021). The Texas Medical Records Privacy Act is one example of
such a state law. Id.
155. HEALTH & SAFETY § 181.001(a) (“Unless otherwise defined in this chapter, each term
that is used in this chapter has the meaning assigned by the [HIPAA Privacy Rule]”); Appendix
at Texas-2.
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“reasonable basis to believe” exists.156 Consequently, a psychiatric
hospital administrator, urgent care receptionist, or other data
custodian not formally trained in statistics or biomedical informatics
might release data like a patient’s standardized diagnostic code without
HIPAA- or state law-compliant157 patient authorization—thinking
there is no reasonable basis to believe the data are identifiable. As
shown by the Vanderbilt researchers, however, a diagnostic code can
be paired with external information to identify the subject of the
diagnostic code.158
Lawmakers need to rethink the use of “reasonable basis to
believe” identification standards, including those set forth in the
HIPAA Privacy Rule, the PPHDA, and the TMRPA. Why? Data
custodians might think that no reasonable basis exists when the
opposite is true. Not all data custodians are familiar with the
reidentification literature. Some sophisticated data custodians,
including some university researchers, may be familiar with this
literature but other data custodians, such as young clerks in small
doctors’ offices, may lack familiarity. The clerk might wrongly assume
that health data that does not include a name could not be reidentified.
Not all data custodians’ beliefs regarding health data identification or
reidentification are reasonable or scientifically supportable.159
2. “Capable (or Reasonably Capable) of Being Associated” and
“Linked (or Reasonably Linkable)” Standards. Other data protection
laws protect data elements that are “capable of being associated with a
particular individual.” For example, a Wisconsin law provides security
protections to “[p]ersonally identifiable data about an individual’s

156. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2021) (defining “individually identifiable health information” and
PHI without reference to particular identifiers); see infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the identifiers
that must be removed in order for protected health information to be considered de-identified
under the HIPAA Safe Harbor).
157. The HIPAA Privacy Rule generally preempts contrary state laws. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203
(2021). However, state laws that are more stringent than the HIPAA Privacy Rule survive
preemption. Id. § 160.203(b). Depending on the results of a HIPAA-preemption analysis (i.e., a
comparison of the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the contrary state law), either the HIPAA Privacy
Rule or the state law must be followed. See generally id. §§ 160.201–160.205 (2021) (setting forth
the HIPAA Privacy preemption provisions).
158. See supra notes 98–111 and accompanying text.
159. See generally NCVHS Letter, supra note 19, at 9 (“The lessons from de-identification
research are not informing day-to-day practice. Practitioners responsible for de-identification and
assessing risk of re-identification in non-research settings are often not adequately trained to
apply critically the latest methods and research findings.”).
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medical condition.”160 The Wisconsin law defines “personally
identifiable” as “capable of being associated with a particular
individual through one or more identifiers or other information or
circumstances.”161 The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018
(“CCPA”) adds an element of reasonableness to the standard set forth
in the Second Wisconsin Act. That is, the CCPA protects information
that “is reasonably capable of being associated with, or could
reasonably be linked, directly or indirectly, with a particular consumer
or household.”162 Virginia and Colorado have followed the CCPA’s
lead with new legislation. The Virginia Consumer Data Protection Act
(“VCDPA”) protects “information that is linked or reasonably
linkable to an identified or identifiable natural person.”163 The
Colorado Privacy Act (“CPA”) also protects information that is
“linked or reasonably linkable to an identified or identifiable
individual.”164
Recent federal bills contain similar standards. For example, one
portion of the federal Data Care Act (“DCA”) of 2021165 would
establish duties of care, loyalty, and confidentiality for online service
providers that handle “individual identifying data.”166 The DCA
defines “individual identifying data” with reference to data that are
160. WIS. STAT. § 134.97(1)(e)(1) (2021); Appendix at Wisconsin-2.
161. WIS. STAT. § 134.97(1)(f) (2021).
162. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(v)(1) (West 2023) (effective Jan. 1, 2023); Appendix at
California-2.
163. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-571 (2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023) (defining “personal data”);
Appendix at Virginia-3. The VCDPA was signed into law on March 2, 2021, and takes effect on
January
1,
2023.
2021
VA.
ACTS
2307,
https://lis.virginia.gov/cgi-bin/
legp604.exe?211+ful+SB1392ES1+pdf [https://perma.cc/36QP-VZKL] (providing an effective
date of January 1, 2023, in Section 3 of the bill); Cat Zakrzewski, Virginia Governor Signs Nation’s
Second State Consumer Privacy Bill, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2021, 8:17 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/03/02/privacy-tech-data-virgina/ [https://
perma.cc/T6LA-SLRW] (stating that then Governor Ralph Northam signed the VCDPA into law
on Tuesday, March 2, 2021).
164. 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 3445, 3448 (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1303(17)(a))
(effective July 1, 2023); Appendix at Colorado-3. The CPA was signed into law on July 7, 2021,
and takes effect on July 1, 2023. . See S.B. 21-190, 73d Gen. Assemb., 1st Sess. § 7 (Colo. 2021),
https://leg.colorado.gov/sites/default/files/2021a_190_signed.pdf [https://perma.cc/F5EK-PBD2]
(listing the general effective date in Section 7 of the bill and showing the date of the Governor’s
signature on the last page of the bill).
165. See generally Data Care Act of 2021, S. 919, 117th Cong. (2021); Appendix at DCA. The
DCA was introduced by Senator Brian Schatz in 2021. S.919 - Data Care Act of 2021,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/senate-bill/919 [https://perma.cc/
Y95Y-MNSX].
166. S. 919 § 3(b)(1)–(3) (establishing the duties of care, loyalty, and confidentiality);
Appendix at DCA.
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“linked, or reasonably linkable, to” certain persons and devices.167
Similarly, the Mind Your Own Business Act (“MYOBA”), introduced
by Senator Ron Wyden (D-OR) in 2019,168 would require the Federal
Trade Commission to promulgate regulations obligating certain
entities to “implement reasonable cyber security and privacy policies,
practices, and procedures to protect personal information.”169
MYOBA defines “personal information” as information “that is
reasonably linkable to a specific consumer or consumer device.”170
Legislation specific to the COVID-19 pandemic also includes the
“linked or reasonably linkable” identification standard. For example,
the COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020 (“CCDPA”)
protects, among other types of data, “persistent identifier[s]” and
“personal health information.”171 The CCDPA defines these terms to
include identifiers and information that are “linked or reasonably
linkable to an individual.”172 Another example, the Public Health
Emergency Privacy Act (“PHEPA”) establishes certain privacy and
security protections for “emergency health data,” defined in relevant
part as “data linked or reasonably linkable to an individual or
device.”173 A final example is the Exposure Notification Privacy Act
(“ENPA”).174 The ENPA imposes certain data privacy and security

167. S. 919 § 2(3)(B); Appendix at DCA.
168. Mind Your Own Business Act of 2019, S. 2637, 116th Cong. § 7 (2019)(stating “Mr.
Wyden introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on
Finance”); Wyden Introduces Mind Your Own Business Act of 2019, COVINGTON: INSIDE
PRIVACY (Oct. 21, 2019), https://www.insideprivacy.com/data-privacy/wyden-introduces-mindyour-own-business-act-of-2019/ [https://perma.cc/4365-8HLP] (“On October 17, Senator Ron
Wyden introduced in the Senate a privacy bill that would expand the FTC’s authority to regulate
data collection and use, allow consumers to opt out of data sharing, and create civil and criminal
penalties for certain violations of the Act.”).
169. S. 2637 § 7; Appendix at MYOBA.
170. S. 2637 § 2(12); Appendix at MYOBA.
171. COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3663, 116th Cong. § 2(6)(A),
(13)–(14) (2020); Appendix at CCDPA. The CCDPA was introduced by Senator Roger Wicker
on May 7, 2020. S.3663 - COVID–19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/3663 [https://perma.cc/K686-9W44].
172. S. 3663 § 2(13)–(14); Appendix at CCDPA.
173. Public Health Emergency Privacy Act, S. 81, 117th Cong. § 2(8) (2021); Appendix at
PHEPA. The PHEPA was re-introduced by Senator Richard Blumenthal on January 28, 2021.
See generally S. 81 (stating on the first page, “IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES;
January 28, 2021; Mr. Blumenthal . . . introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions”).
174. ENPA was introduced by Senator Maria Cantwell on June 1, 2020. Exposure
Notification Privacy Act, S. 3861, 116th Cong. (2020), (stating on the first page, “IN THE
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES; June 1, 2020; Ms. Cantwell . . . introduced the following
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standards on operators of automated infectious disease exposure
notification services with respect to “covered data.”175 “Covered data”
is defined as information that is “linked or reasonably linkable” to
individuals and certain devices.176
“Capable (or reasonably capable) of being associated” and
“linked (or reasonably linkable)” standards such as those used in the
above statutes are insufficient to protect patient privacy and health
information confidentiality. Why? Because health data custodians who
are not familiar with the reidentification literature presented in Part I
might think that a data element is not capable of being associated with
a particular individual (or is not linkable to a particular individual)
when quite the opposite is true. Stated another way, some data
custodians’ beliefs regarding data association and data linkage may be
unfounded and/or unsupported.
3. “Sufficient to Perform or Attempt to Perform Identity Theft”
Standards. Other data protection laws apply to information that is
“sufficient to perform or attempt to perform identity theft.”177 For
example, the Georgia Personal Identity Protection Act (“Georgia
Act”) protects information that “would be sufficient to perform or
attempt to perform identity theft.”178 Similarly, the Maine Notice of
Risk to Personal Data Act (“Maine Act”) protects information that
“would be sufficient to permit a person to fraudulently assume or
attempt to assume the identity of the person.”179 The Oregon Identity
Theft Protection Act (“Oregon Act”) applies when “[t]he data element
or combination of data elements would enable a person to commit
identity theft.”180 The Washington Notice of Security Breaches Act
(“Washington Act”) also applies when “[t]he data element or
combination of data elements would enable a person to commit
identity theft.”181
bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation”).
175. Id. §§ 3–7 (imposing standards on operators of automated exposure notification
services).
176. Exposure Notification Privacy Act, S. 3861, 116th Cong. § 2(6) (2020); Appendix at
ENPA.
177. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-911(6)(E) (2021); Appendix at Georgia-1.
178. GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-911(6)(E).
179. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1347(6)(E) (2021); Appendix at Maine.
180. OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.602(12)(a)(C)(ii) (West 2021); Appendix at Oregon.
181. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.255.005(2)(a)(iii)(B) (West 2021); Appendix at
Washington.
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“Sufficient to perform or attempt to perform identity theft”
identification standards suffer from the same weakness as “reasonable
basis to believe” and “reasonably capable of being associated with.”
Unsophisticated data custodians might think that data are insufficient
to perform or attempt to perform identity theft when the data may
easily be reidentified, thus leading to identity theft. These data
custodians may not know or may underestimate the ability of a data
element to be paired with external data and reidentified.
4. “First Name or First Initial and Last Name” Standards. A
number of data protection laws protect health data when the data
contain the first name or first initial and last name of the data subject.
These laws may be referred to as “first name or first initial and last
name” laws. The Alabama Data Breach Notification Act (“Alabama
Act”), for example, only protects “sensitive personally identifying
information,” defined as “an Alabama resident’s first name or first
initial and last name in combination with” certain other classes of
information, including “[a]ny information regarding an individual’s
medical history, mental or physical condition, or medical treatment or
diagnosis by a health care professional.”182 The Alabama Act requires
breach notification—a form of legal protection for a data subject183—
when a breach occurs and the breached data include the subject’s “first
name or first initial and last name” in combination with other
information.184 Breach notification is unavailable, however, when a
breach occurs and the breached data do not contain the subject’s first
name or first initial and last name.185
Similar “first name or first initial and last name” standards are set
forth in the laws of Alaska,186 Arkansas,187 Connecticut,188 Delaware,189

182. ALA. CODE § 8-38-2(6)(a)(4) (2021); Appendix at Alabama.
183. Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Apr. 15, 2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breachnotification-laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/S2R8-QFSK] (providing citations to state laws that offer
legal protections afforded to individuals whose data is breached and briefly summarizing these
laws).
184. See ALA. CODE §§ 8-38-2(6)(a)(4), 8-38-5(a) (2021).
185. Id.
186. ALASKA STAT. § 45.48.090(7)(A)(i)–(ii) (2021); Appendix at Alaska.
187. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-103(7) (2021); Appendix at Arkansas.
188. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-701b(a) (2021); Appendix at Connecticut-1.
189. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 12B-100, 12B-101(7)(a) (2021); Appendix at Delaware-1.
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Kansas,192
Kentucky,193
Louisiana,194
Hawaii,190Idaho,191
Massachusetts195 Michigan,196 Minnesota,197 Mississippi,198 Missouri,199
Montana,200 Nevada,201 New Hampshire,202 New Jersey,203 New
Mexico,204 North Carolina,205 North Dakota,206 Ohio,207 Oklahoma,208
Pennsylvania,209 Rhode Island,210 South Carolina,211 Tennessee,212
Utah,213 Vermont,214 Virginia,215 West Virginia,216 Wisconsin,217 and
Wyoming.218 These data protection laws all require (and sometimes
only require) the presence of the data subject’s first name or first initial
and last name before legal protections attach.
“First name or first initial and last name” identification standards
present a higher than necessary risk of data reidentification and should
not be used in data protection laws. One reason is because not one of
the datasets described in Part I of this Article contained the patients’
first names or first initials and last names. That is, not one of those

190. HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-1 (2021); Appendix at Hawaii-1; HAW. REV. STAT. § 487R-1
(2020); Appendix at Hawaii-2.
191. IDAHO CODE § 28-51-104(5) (2021); Appendix at Idaho.
192. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a01(g) (West 2021); Appendix at Kansas.
193. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.732(1)(c) (West 2021); Appendix at Kentucky-2.
194. LA. STAT. ANN. § 51:3073(4)(a) (2020); Appendix at Louisiana.
195. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, § 1(a) (West 2021); Appendix at Massachusetts.
196. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.63(r) (2021); Appendix at Michigan.
197. MINN. STAT. § 325E.61(1)(e) (West 2021); Appendix at Minnesota.
198. MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-24-29(2)(b) (2021); Appendix at Mississippi.
199. MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.1500(1)(9) (West 2021); Appendix at Missouri.
200. MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1704(4)(b)(i) (West 2021); Appendix at Montana-2.
201. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 603A.040(1) (LexisNexis 2021); Appendix at Nevada-1.
202. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:19(IV)(a) (2020); Appendix at New Hampshire.
203. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-161 (West 2021); Appendix at New Jersey.
204. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-12C-2(C) (2021); Appendix at New Mexico.
205. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-61(10) (2021); Appendix at North Carolina.
206. N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-01(4)(a) (2021); Appendix at North Dakota.
207. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19(A)(7)(a) (LexisNexis 2021); Appendix at Ohio.
208. OKLA. STAT. tit. 24, § 162(6) (2021); Appendix at Oklahoma.
209. 2005 Pa. Laws 474; Appendix at Pennsylvania.
210. 11 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.3-3(a)(8) (2021); Appendix at Rhode Island.
211. S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90(D)(3) (2020); Appendix at South Carolina.
212. TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107(a)(4)(A) (2021); Appendix at Tennessee-1.
213. UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-44-102(4)(a) (West 2021); Appendix at Utah-1.
214. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2430(10)(A) (2020); Appendix at Vermont-2.
215. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6(A) (2021); Appendix at Virginia-1.
216. W. VA. CODE § 46A-2A-101(6) (2021); Appendix at West Virginia.
217. WIS. STAT. § 134.98(1)(b) (2021); Appendix at Wisconsin-1.
218. WYO. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-501(a)(vii) (2021); Appendix at Wyoming.
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datasets would be protected by the data protection laws listed in the
preceding paragraph. Yet technology companies, research teams, news
reporters, and lay community members successfully reidentified the
nameless data based on the presence of less direct identifiers, such as a
patient’s geolocation,219 the date of a patient’s adverse drug event,220
and a patient’s diagnostic code.221 “First name or first initial and last
name” identification standards are vulnerable to reidentification when
certain other non-name data elements are present.
5. “Name, Username, or Email Address Plus Password” Standards.
Other data protection laws require the presence of either the first name
or first initial and last name of the data subject or the subject’s
username or email address in combination with a password or security
question and answer. These laws may be referred to as “name,
username, or email address plus password” laws. These laws recognize
that a person’s identity (e.g., Stacey Tovino) may be determined from
the person’s username (e.g., STovino) or email address (e.g.,
Stacey.Tovino@ou.edu).
To illustrate, an Arizona law defines “personal information” as
either “[a]n individual’s first name or first initial and last name in
combination with one or more specified data elements [or an]
individual’s user name or email address, in combination with a
password or security question and answer, that allows access to an
online account.”222 Other state laws containing the same “name,
username, or email address plus password” standard include those in
Florida,223 Illinois,224 Maryland,225 Nebraska,226 and California.227

219. See supra notes 41–53 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 89–95 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 98–111 and accompanying text.
222. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-551(7)(a) (2021); Appendix at Arizona. The Arizona Act
expressly applies to health information because the Act defines “[s]pecified data element” to
include, among other items, “[i]nformation about an individual’s medical or mental health
treatment or diagnosis by a health care professional,” and “[u]nique biometric data generated
from a measurement or analysis of human body characteristics to authenticate an individual when
the individual accesses an online account.” See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-551(11)(f), (i) (2021);
Appendix at Arizona.
223. FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(g)(1) (2021); Appendix at Florida.
224. 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/5 (2021); Appendix at Illinois.
225. MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3501(e)(1) (West 2021); Appendix at Maryland.
226. NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-802(5) (2021); Appendix at Nebraska.
227. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(d)(1)(A)–(B) (West 2021); Appendix at California-1.
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This Article argues that “name, user name, or email address plus
password” standards are unlikely to minimize the risk of
reidentification. Not one of the datasets from Part I contained the
patients’ names, usernames, or email addresses plus passwords. Yet,
technology companies, research teams, news reporters, and lay
community members successfully reidentified the (user)name-less data
using other, less direct, identifiers, such as apatient’s geolocation,228 the
date of a patient’s adverse drug event,229 and a patient’s diagnostic
code.230
6. “Multiple Data Element” Standards. Perhaps recognizing the
weaknesses of each of the identification standards discussed above,
some federal and state authorities allow a broader range of non-name
data elements to be considered for legal protection. The CCPA assists
data custodians by identifying twelve different paragraphs’ worth of
identifiers that qualify for legal protection.231 Illustrative identifiers
include, but certainly are not limited to, medical information,232
biometric information,233 and geolocation data.234 The Colorado
Consumer Protection Act also protects multiple, specific data elements
such as “a social security number; a personal identification number; a
password; a pass code; an official state or government-issued driver’s
license or identification card number; a government passport number;
biometric data . . . ; an employer, student, or military identification
number; or a financial transaction device.”235 The California Shine the
Light Act protects a very long list of data elements including, but not
limited to, “[a]n individual’s name and address,” email address, “age
or date of birth,” names of children, email “or other addresses of
children,” number of children, “age or gender of children,” height,
weight, race, religion, occupation, telephone number, education,
political party affiliation, medical condition, drugs, and “[i]nformation

228. See supra notes 41–53 and accompanying text.
229. See supra notes 89–95 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 98–111 and accompanying text.
231. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(v) (West 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023).
232. Id. § 1798.140(v)(1)(B) (referencing a definition in CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.80(e) (West
2021) that includes “medical information”); Appendix at California-2.
233. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(v)(1)(E) (West 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023) (specifically
listing “[b]iometric information”); Appendix at California-2.
234. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(v)(1)(G) (West 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023) (specifically
listing “[g]eolocation data”); Appendix at California-2.
235. COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-713(2)(b) (2021); Appendix at Colorado-1.
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pertaining to creditworthiness, assets, income, or liabilities.”236 State
laws in Connecticut,237 the District of Columbia,238 Kentucky,239
Nevada,240 and Vermont241 also contain “multiple data element”
standards. The federal PHEPA also contains a “multiple data element”
identification standard.242 That is, the PHEPA protects geolocation
data, proximity data, “genetic data, biological samples, . . . biometric[]”
data, demographic data, contact data, and “any other data collected
from a personal device.”243
One benefit of multiple data element identification standards is
that an unsophisticated data custodian can review the data for one or
more enumerated elements and know the data are legally protected
when one element is discovered. A second benefit—at least from the
perspective of those who value the individual right to privacy over
research and activities that benefit the wider population—is that
identification standards containing high numbers of data elements will
increase the amount of data receiving legal protection.
However, multiple data element identification standards that
include high numbers of protected identifiers do run the risk of
reducing or eliminating the usefulness of unregulated data for healthrelated records research, public health initiatives, informed health-care
decision-making, and other public benefit activities.244 In addition,
“multiple data element” identification standards require lawmakers to
make difficult decisions regarding which data elements to include in
the standard, with consequences that they may not understand.
As background for this last point, recall the Kaiser Permanente
researchers whose work was highlighted in Part I.B of this Article.
These researchers found that the risk of health data reidentification
depends on three factors: (1) the availability of public, semi-public, or
private external data containing one or more elements that overlap
with the health data; (2) “the size of the class defined by those

236. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83(e)(7) (West 2021); Appendix at California-3.
237. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-471(c)(1) (2021); Appendix at Connecticut-2.
238. See D.C. CODE § 28-3851(3)(A) (2021); Appendix at District of Columbia.
239. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.720(4) (West 2021); Appendix at Kentucky-1.
240. See NEV. REV. STAt. ANN. § 603A.320 (LexisNexis 2021); Appendix at Nevada-2.
241. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2445(a)(3) (2021); Appendix at Vermont-1.
242. See Public Health Emergency Privacy Act, S. 81, 117th Cong. § 2(8) (2021); Appendix
at PHEPA.
243. S. 81; Appendix at PHEPA.
244. See, e.g., supra notes 111, 137 and accompanying text (explaining that too-strong data
perturbation techniques can minimize the clinical and other usefulness of health data).
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overlapping elements in which the [health data] falls;” and (3) “the
overlap in the population covered by the [health data] and the
population covered by the external data.”245 The difficulty with
applying this three-factor framework in the context of health data is
that there is not just one type of health data.
Health data comes in many forms, including general medical
record data, hospital discharge data, health and fitness data, infectious
disease data, suicide risk data, genetic data, biometric data,
prescription data, and even general consumer data. Each type’s
reidentification risk varies depending on the availability of external
data containing elements common to that type. A multiple data
element standard that includes one data element, such as a patient’s
diagnostic code, a patient’s age in months, or a patient’s geolocation,
may reduce the risk of reidentifying some forms of health data but not
others. Thus, a lawmaker who drafts a data protection law containing
a multiple data element standard must (1) consider all types of health
data that are created, collected, used, and/or disclosed in the
jurisdiction; (2) decide which classes of health data are worthy of or are
in need of legal protection in that jurisdiction; and (3) consider which
data elements will reduce the risk of reidentification of each such class
of data. This is not an easy task.
In summary, multiple data element identification standards offer
the benefit of clarity and ease of application for unsophisticated data
custodians. Multiple data element identification standards, to the
extent they include high numbers and types of data elements, also
increase the amount of data receiving legal protection. However, long
multiple data element standards will reduce or eliminate the clinical,
research, and other public utility of unprotected health data.
Moreover, lawmakers will struggle to draft perfect multiple data
element standards because including particular data elements will
affect the reidentification risk of some forms of health data but not
others.
B. De-Identification Standards
Because de-identification, or the loss of legal protection, has the
same end result as a lack of identification, or a lack of initial legal
protection, de-identification standards also must be assessed to
understand the scope of data protection laws. Data protection laws

245.

See supra notes 114–116 and accompanying text.
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incorporate a wide range of de-identification standards, including
“truncated, modified, or redacted” (“TMR”) standards, “laundry list”
safe harbors, “expert determination” standards, “public commitment
plus contractual obligation” standards, and “delegation to
administrative agency” standards.
Understanding the application of these de-identification standards
is important. In the context of a patient privacy or health information
confidentiality law, losing legal protection may mean that a data
custodian is permitted to use or disclose a patient’s data without the
patient’s prior written authorization.246 The patient will lose the
opportunity to make an autonomous decision about the use and
disclosure of sensitive, and perhaps stigmatizing, health information.
In the context of a breach notification law, losing legal protection may
mean that a patient will not be notified when a privacy or security
breach involves their data.247 The patient will lose the ability to
implement a credit freeze or otherwise respond proactively to the
privacy or security breach.248
1. “Truncated, Modified, or Redacted” Standards. Many data
protection laws contain very general “truncated” or “modified” deidentification standards, where data lose legal protection when
truncated or modified. For example, an Alabama law does not apply if
the data are “truncated . . . or modified by any other method or

246. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Unauthorized
Filming for “NY Med” Results in $2.2 Million Settlement with New York Presbyterian Hospital
(Apr. 21, 2016), https://wayback.archive-it.org/3926/20170128230744/https://www.hhs.gov/
about/news/2016/04/21/unauthorized-filming-ny-med-results-22-million-settlement-new-yorkpresbyterian-hospital.html [https://perma.cc/F9AD-Z3HD] (imposing a $2.2 million resolution
agreement amount on New York Presbyterian Hospital, which had allowed ABC film crews to
enter its hospital and film patients receiving care as part of a medical documentary series without
obtaining the prior written authorization of the patients filmed).
247. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, First HIPAA
Enforcement Action for Lack of Timely Breach Notification Settles for $475,000 (Jan. 9, 2017),
http://wayback.archive-it.org/3926/20170127111957/https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2017/01/09/
first-hipaa-enforcement-action-lack-timely-breach-notification-settles-475000.html [https://
perma.cc/NE66-SRVF] (imposing a $475,000 resolution agreement amount on Presence Health,
which failed to notify 836 individuals that their information had been breached, and explaining
that “[i]ndividuals need prompt notice of a breach of their unsecured PHI so they can take action
that could help mitigate any potential harm caused by the breach”).
248. See Stacey A. Tovino, Health Privacy, Security, and Information Management, in LAWS
OF MEDICINE: CORE LEGAL ASPECTS FOR THE HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONAL (Springer Nature
Switzerland forthcoming 2022) (manuscript at 9–10) (on file with author) (discussing cases in
which patients have suffered privacy and security breaches as well as the legal consequences of
those breaches).
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technology that removes elements that personally identify an
individual.”249 By further example, a Florida law does not apply to
“information that is . . . modified by any other method or technology
that removes elements that personally identify an individual or that
otherwise renders the information unusable.”250
Other states use “redacted.” Redacted information is not
protected under laws in Alaska,251 Arkansas,252 California,253
Colorado,254 Georgia,255 Illinois,256 Kentucky,257 Louisiana,258
Maryland,259 New Mexico,260 South Carolina,261 or Wisconsin.262 Not
one of these laws defines “redacted.” Thus, unsophisticated data
custodians might think that they have redacted sufficient data when the
remaining data are reidentifiable.

249. ALA. CODE § 8-38-2(6)(b)(2) (2021); Appendix at Alabama.
250. FLA. STAT. § 501.171(1)(g)(2) (2021); Appendix at Florida.
251. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 45.48.010, 45.48.090(7) (2021) (defining protected “personal
information” to exclude “encrypted or redacted” information); Appendix at Alaska.
252. See ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 4-110-103(7), -104 to -105 (2021) (defining protected “personal
information” to exclude “encrypted or redacted” data elements); Appendix at Arkansas.
253. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5(a)–(d)(1)(A) (West 2021) (defining protected
“personal information” to exclude “encrypted or redacted” information); Appendix at California1.
254. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716(1)(g), (2)(a) (2021) (defining protected “personal
information” to exclude “encrypted, redacted, or secured” data elements); Appendix at
Colorado-2.
255. See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-911(6), -912(a)–(b) (2021) (defining protected “personal
information” to exclude “encrypted or redacted” data elements); Appendix at Georgia-1.
256. See 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 530/5–530/10 (2020) (defining protected “personal
information” to exclude “encrypted or redacted” data elements); Appendix at Illinois.
257. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365.732(1)(c)–(3) (West 2021) (defining protected
“personally identifiable information” to exclude redacted data elements); Appendix at Kentucky2.
258. See LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:3073(4)(a), :3074 (2021) (defining protected “personal
information” to exclude “encrypted or redacted” data elements); Appendix at Louisiana.
259. See MD. CODE. ANN., COM. LAW §§ 14-3501(e)(1)(i), -3502 (West 2021) (defining
protected “personal information” to exclude “encrypted, redacted, or otherwise protected” data
elements); Appendix at Maryland.
260. See N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 57-12C-2(C) to -6 (2021) (defining protected “personal
identifying information” to exclude data elements “protected through encryption or redaction”);
Appendix at New Mexico.
261. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-1-90(A)–(D)(3) (2021) (defining protected “[p]ersonal
identifying information” to exclude “encrypted [or] redacted” data elements); Appendix at South
Carolina.
262. See WIS. STAT. § 134.98(1)(b), (2) (2021) (defining protected “[p]ersonal information”
to exclude “encrypted, redacted, or altered” data elements); Appendix at Wisconsin-1.
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“Redacted” information also is not protected under laws in
Arizona,263 Hawaii,264 Indiana,265 Iowa,266 and Virginia.267 But these laws
do define “redacted,” “redact,” or “redaction.” Under the Virginia law,
for example, “[r]edact” means the “alteration or truncation of data
such that no information regarding an individual’s medical history,
mental or physical condition, or medical treatment or diagnosis, or no
more than four digits of a health insurance policy number, subscriber
number, or other unique identifier are accessible as part of the medical
information.”268 Under the Arizona law, “‘[r]edact’ means to alter or
truncate a number so that no more than the last four digits are
accessible and at least two digits have been removed.”269 Under the
Hawaii law, “‘[r]edacted’ means the rendering of data so that it is
unreadable or is truncated so that no more than the last four digits of
the identification number are accessible as part of the data.”270
“Redacted,” “redact,” or “redaction” are similarly (although not
identically) defined in laws in Indiana,271 Iowa,272 Kansas,273
Michigan,274 Missouri,275 Nebraska,276 North Carolina,277 Ohio,278

263. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-551(1), -552 (2021) (protecting against “[b]reach[es]”
or “security system breach[es],” defined to include only the compromising of “unencrypted and
unredacted . . . personal information”); Appendix at Arizona.
264. See HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 487N-1 to -2 (2021) (protecting against “[s]ecurity breach[es],”
defined to include the unauthorized access of only “unencrypted or unredacted records or data
containing personal information”); Appendix at Hawaii-1.
265. See IND. CODE §§ 24-4.9-2-10 to -3-3.5 (2021) (defining protected “[p]ersonal
information” to exclude “encrypted or redacted” data elements); Appendix at Indiana.
266. See IOWA CODE §§ 715C.1(11), 715C.2 (2021) (defining protected “[p]ersonal
information” to exclude “encrypted, redacted, or otherwise altered” data elements); Appendix at
Iowa.
267. See VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:05(B) (2021) (protecting against breaches of
“unencrypted or unredacted medical information”); Appendix at Virginia-2.
268. VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-127.1:05(A).
269. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-551(9) (2021); Appendix at Arizona.
270. HAW. REV. STAT. § 487N-1 (2021); Appendix at Hawaii-1.
271. IND. CODE § 24-4.9-2-11 (2021); Appendix at Indiana.
272. IOWA CODE § 715C.1(12) (2021); Appendix at Iowa.
273. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-7a01(d) (West 2021); Appendix at Kansas.
274. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445.63(t) (2020); Appendix at Michigan.
275. MO. ANN. STAT. § 407.1500(1)(10) (West 2020); Appendix at Missouri.
276. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87-802(6) (West 2021); Appendix at Nebraska.
277. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-61(13) (2021); Appendix at North Carolina.
278. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.19(A)(9) (LexisNexis 2021); Appendix at Ohio.
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Oklahoma,279 Oregon,280 Pennsylvania,281 Vermont,282 Virginia,283 and
West Virginia.284
This Article contends that lawmakers need to avoid the use of
TMR de-identification standards in which the words truncated,
modified, and redacted are undefined. Unsophisticated data
custodians attempting to implement these standards might think that
redacting a patient’s first name, last name, and email address is
sufficient even though the remaining information could easily be
matched with available external data. TMR de-identification standards
that include definitions would be more helpful to unsophisticated data
custodians. Consider a medical records custodian who is instructed to
remove date stamps, patients’ ages in months, and the dates of patients’
adverse health events. Complying with this instruction would seem
easier than interpreting a vague instruction to “truncate all identifiable
data elements.”
However—and as with the multiple data element identification
standard—a defined TMR standard that includes a high number of
data elements will reduce or eliminate the clinical, research, and other
utility of the health data. Lawmakers will struggle to draft perfectly
defined TMR standards. Recall that removing particular data elements
will affect the risk of reidentification of some forms of health data but
not others.285
2. “Laundry List” Safe Harbors. Some data protection laws
contain what may be referred to as “laundry list” de-identification safe
harbors. For example, the HIPAA Privacy Rule identifies eighteen
particular data elements that must be removed from information.286 If
these data elements are removed and the HIPAA-covered data
custodian “does not have actual knowledge that the information could
be used alone or in combination with other information to identify an
individual who is a subject of the information,” the information is
considered de-identified under the HIPAA Safe Harbor and is no

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.

OKLA. STAT. tit. 24, § 162(8) (2021); Appendix at Oklahoma.
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 646A.602(16) (West 2021); Appendix at Oregon.
2005 Pa. Laws 474; Appendix at Pennsylvania.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2430(12) (2021); Appendix at Vermont-2.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-186.6(A) (2021); Appendix at Virginia-1.
W. VA. CODE § 46A-2A-101(8) (2021); Appendix at West Virginia.
See supra Part I.B.
45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2020); Appendix at HIPAA.
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longer protected by the HIPAA Privacy Rule.287 Some states
incorporate by reference the HIPAA Safe Harbor. For example, the
CPA provides that personal data is not regulated by the CPA if it is
“[d]e-identified in accordance with the [Safe Harbor].”288
The eighteen identifiers that must be removed under the Safe
Harbor include (1) names, (2) “[a]ll geographic subdivisions smaller
than a [s]tate,” (3) “[a]ll elements of dates,” including years or dates of
birth, (4) telephone numbers, (5) fax numbers, (6) email addresses, (7)
social security numbers, (8) medical record numbers, (9) “[h]ealth plan
beneficiary numbers,” (10) account numbers, (11) certificate and
license numbers, (12) vehicle identifiers and license plate numbers,
(13) device identifiers, (14) “[u]niversal [r]esource [l]ocators URLs,”
(15) “[i]nternet [p]rotocol (IP) address numbers,” (16) biometric
identifiers, (17) full facial photographs and comparable images, and
(18) “[a]ny other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code.”289
One problem with the “actual knowledge” portion of the Safe
Harbor is that it can insulate unsophisticated HIPAA covered entities.
Consider an isolated doctor, dentist, psychologist, or other covered
health-care professional who is not up-to-date on the reidentification
literature and lacks actual knowledge that facially de-identified data
can still be combined with external data to reidentify the data subject.
Requiring actual knowledge may also shield sophisticated covered
entities who may have, but do not wish to make public, their actual
knowledge.
One problem with the “laundry list” portion of the HIPAA Safe
Harbor is the eighteenth provision. It requires the removal of “[a]ny
other unique identifying number, characteristic, or code.”290 Again,
unsophisticated data custodians who are not familiar with the
reidentification literature may think that a particular number,
characteristic, or code (such as a standardized diagnostic code) is not
uniquely identifying, when the code could easily be matched with
external data for reidentification.
Moreover, the laundry list shares the strengths and limitations of
the multiple data element identification standard. That is, the “laundry
list” offers the benefit of clarity for unsophisticated data custodians and

287. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a)–(b); Appendix at HIPAA.
288. 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 3445, 3451 (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-11304(1)(g)(I)) (effective July 1, 2023); Appendix at Colorado-3.
289. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i); Appendix at HIPAA.
290. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(R); Appendix at HIPAA.
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will increase the amount of data receiving legal protection due to the
long list of identifiers that must be removed. However, the laundry list
that must be removed may also reduce or eliminate the data’s clinical,
research, and other public utility.291 In addition, lawmakers who wish
to adopt a similar list must carefully attend to the selection of the
particular identifiers requiring removal and be aware of how particular
elements will impact the risk of reidentification.292
Recall that the HIPAA Safe Harbor has been empirically tested.
Harvard University researchers de-identified Maine hospital discharge
data in accordance with the Safe Harbor.293 Yet reidentification was
still possible in 3.2 percent of cases.294 De-identified Vermont hospital
discharge data in accordance with the Safe Harbor yielded a
reidentification rate of 10.6 percent.295 The researchers’ conclusions
were startling but consistent with this Article’s analyses: (1) “patients’
personal information is vulnerable to re-identification even when
hospital data is de-identified according to HIPAA Safe Harbor
guidelines[;]”296 (2) “[the] HIPAA Safe Harbor’s framework is often
considered the de facto standard for protecting patient privacy even
though HIPAA has not been rigorously confirmed to guarantee
privacy[;]”297 (3) “[t]he de-identification checklist that HIPAA Safe
Harbor promotes is the bare minimum protection against reidentification[;]”298 (4) “[a] more rigorous inquiry on the vulnerabilities
that exist even when following HIPAA Safe Harbor as a standard for
de-identification” is needed;299 (5) “[p]olicy-makers and data-sharing
centers should consider scientifically tested protocols that guarantee
291. See generally NCVHS Letter, supra note 19, at 8 (“[D]e-identification reduces the
quality and utility of data, the consequence of which must be judged against the characteristics of
the dataset and the intended uses.”). The HIPAA Privacy Rule recognizes this point through its
creation of an easier-to-satisfy “limited data set” (“LDS”) provision for uses and disclosures of
protected health information for “research, public health, [and] health care operations.” See 45
C.F.R. § 164.514(e). Compared to information de-identified in accordance with the HIPAA Safe
Harbor, an LDS contains a few additional identifiers. See id. § 164.514(e)(2) (listing only sixteen
identifiers that must be excluded).
292. See generally NCVHS Letter, supra note 19, at 12 (noting that the HIPAA “deidentification standard is too often executed with inadequate attention to the unique
characteristics of the dataset to which it is applied and its intended uses”).
293. See supra notes 59–64 and accompanying text.
294. Ji Su Yoo et al., supra note 58, at 3.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 44.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 3.
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privacy protections to patients, especially since they cannot opt out of
inclusion in hospital records[;]”300 and (6) “states should revisit deidentification practices and reassess risks to patient privacy when
determining data sharing protocol.”301
3. “Expert Determination” Standard. The HIPAA Privacy Rule
also permits health information to be freely used and disclosed if an
expert has determined that the information is de-identified (“Expert
Determination”).302 In an Expert Determination, “[a] person with
appropriate knowledge of and experience with generally accepted
statistical and scientific principles and methods for rendering
information not individually identifiable” must “apply[] such principles
and methods” and “determine[] that the risk is very small that the
information could be used, alone or in combination with other
reasonably available information, by an anticipated recipient to
identify an individual who is a subject of the information.”303 In theory,
an expert could determine that data elements required to be removed
by the Safe Harbor could remain or that additional data elements not
listed in the Safe Harbor must be removed.304
Expert Determinations have the benefit of overcoming the
challenges posed by unsophisticated data custodians. An average data
custodian may struggle to interpret or apply vague identification and
de-identification standards, such as the “reasonable basis to believe”
standard, the “reasonably linkable” standard, or an undefined TMR
standard. However, the Expert Determination removes this
responsibility from the unsophisticated data custodian and places it on
the shoulders of an individual who knows and has experience with
relevant statistical and scientific principles for rendering information
not individually identifiable.
One limitation of the Expert Determination standard is that, as
currently written, it does not specify the minimum education, training,
experience, skills, or competencies necessary for an individual to

300. Id. at 44.
301. Id. at 2.
302. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1) (2020) (setting forth requirements for de-identification of
protected health information by an expert); NCVHS Letter, supra note 19, at 2 (summarizing the
Expert Determination standard).
303. 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1).
304. Simon, supra note 20, at 3.
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qualify as an expert.305 Some covered entities may think a particular
employee, contractor, or consultant qualifies when the individual is less
knowledgeable than what the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”) intended. Thus, HHS should amend the Expert
Determination standard in the HIPAA Privacy Rule to specify
minimum expert skills and competencies.
A second limitation is that regulated entities must have access to
qualifying experts or the resources necessary to acquire such access.
Academic medical centers likely have in-house statisticians or
scientists who are or could become sufficiently knowledgeable in
rendering information not individually identifiable. If not, these
centers likely can afford to contract with qualifying experts. It is less
likely that the hundreds of thousands of small physician offices and
clinics across the United States have the time and resources to obtain
a proper Expert Determination before using or disclosing health
data.306
4. “Public Commitment Plus Contractual Obligation” Standards.
Other de-identification standards require regulated entities, among
other measures, to (1) publicly commit to maintaining the information
in de-identified form and not reidentify the information and (2) impose
downstream contractual obligations on information recipients,
pursuant to which the recipients agree to adhere to the same data
protection requirements that apply to the regulated entity. The
CCPA,307 CCDPA,308 ENPA,309 VCDPA,310 CPA,311 and the
Information Transparency and Personal Data Control Act312 follow
this “public commitment plus contractual obligation” de-identification

305. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(1) (not specifying any particular education, training,
experience, skills, or competencies); Appendix at HIPAA.
306. See generally NCVHS Letter, supra note 19, at 8 (noting that the Expert Determination
is “more expensive, and there are too few experts available for hire”).
307. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(m)(2)–(3) (West 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023); Appendix at
California-2.
308. COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3663, 116th Cong. § 2(9)(C)–(D)
(2020); Appendix at CCDPA.
309. Exposure Notification Privacy Act, S. 3861, 116th Cong. § 2(2)(B), (D) (2020);
Appendix at ENPA.
310. VA. CODE ANN. § 59.1-575 (2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023); Appendix at Virginia-3.
311. 2021 Colo. Sess. Laws 3445, 3448 (to be codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-1303(11)(b)–
(c)) (effective July 1, 2023); Appendix at Colorado-3.
312. Information Transparency & Personal Data Control Act, H.R. 1816, 117th Cong.
§ 7(6)(C)–(F) (2021); Appendix at ITPDCA.

TOVINO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/19/2022 4:31 PM

1028

[Vol. 71:985

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

standard. From a privacy standpoint, the public commitment portion
of this standard would help companies like Google determine which
patients have reidentification worries.313 However, it is unclear how the
downstream contractual obligation portion would be applied when the
information recipient is a state agency that operates a database
designed to foster health-care cost, utilization, and efficacy research.
Would the state agency be responsible for ensuring that every
researcher who accesses the database also agrees to the data protection
requirements? If so, would there be an exception for reidentification
research, like that done by the Harvard, Berkeley, and Vanderbilt
researchers in Part I?314 Moreover, privacy regimes that initially relied
on downstream privacy contracting, such as the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s
business associate agreement provisions, ultimately moved to direct
regulation when downstream contracting proved insufficient.315 It is a
real fear that downstream contractual obligations are an insufficient
first step when direct regulation would be simpler and more effective.
Finally, it is not clear the downstream contractual obligations will
impact or otherwise deter non-researcher adversaries who illicitly
obtain health data or try to reidentify health data for personal,
professional, or financial gain.
5. “Delegation to Administrative Agency” Standard. Perhaps given
the limitations of the de-identification standards discussed above, one
313. See, e.g., Dinerstein Lawsuit, supra note 9, at 24–30 (explaining how Google could
reidentify the plaintiff’s University of Chicago Medical Center visit data because he used Google
products and services that tracked his geolocation).
314. See supra notes 55–73, 98–111 and accompanying text. The CCPA has considered this
point, permitting businesses to “attempt to reidentify the information solely for the purpose of
determining whether its deidentification processes satisfy the requirements of [the CCPA].” ].”
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(m)(2) (West 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023); Appendix at California-2.
315. Before President Obama signed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act
(“ARRA”) into law in 2009, the HIPAA Privacy Rule directly (and only) regulated covered
entities that included health plans, health care clearinghouses, and certain health care providers.
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82462, 82798
(Dec. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. § 160.102) (making the HIPAA Privacy Rule
applicable only to health plans, health care clearinghouses, and certain health care providers).
These covered entities were required to enter into downstream business associate agreements
with their business associates (“BAs”), thus contractually obligating the BAs to maintain the
confidentiality of the covered entities’ protected health information. American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of the U.S. Code). Recognizing the insufficiency of downstream privacy
contracting, the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act within the
ARRA changed this scheme such that BAs became directly regulated by the HIPAA Privacy
Rule. See id. § 13404(a), (c), 123 Stat. at 264 (applying the HIPAA Privacy Rule provisions and
the violation penalties directly to BAs).
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recent federal bill simply directs an administrative agency to
promulgate de-identification regulations. The PPHDA would direct
HHS to “consider appropriate standards for the de-identification of
personal health data.”316 The PPHDA does not, however, contain
further direction regarding permissible regulatory methods of deidentification. In addition, the PPHDA does not recognize the growing
risk of reidentification other than one provision directing a task force
to “study the long-term effectiveness of de-identification
methodologies” in two limited contexts: “genetic data and biometric
data.”317 Although genetic and biometric data are frequently noted for
their privacy concerns,318 this Article has intentionally highlighted
reidentification success stories that do not involve genetic or biometric
data to illustrate the many contexts where reidentification can occur.
A final concern with PPHDA’s approach is that federal deidentification regulations could take years for HHS to promulgate (if
HHS even promulgates them),319 during which the science of
reidentification marches on.
III. PROPOSALS
Part II identified the weaknesses of current and pending standards
for health data identification and de-identification. Is there a way that
these weaknesses can be minimized? Is there a way to strengthen legal
protections for identifiable as well as potentially reidentifiable health
data? Six theoretical alternatives are offered below.

316. Protecting Personal Health Data Act, S. 24, 117th Cong. § 4(b)(2)(F) (2021); Appendix
at PPHDA.
317. S. 24 § 5(b)(1); Appendix at PPHDA.
318. See, e.g., Nora von Thenen, Erman Ayday & A. Ercument Cicek, Re-Identification of
Individuals in Genomic Data-Sharing Beacons Via Allele Inference, 35 BIOINFORMATICS 365, 365
(2019) (“We show that countermeasures such as hiding certain parts of the genome or setting a
query budget for the user would fail to protect the privacy of the participants.”); Zachary Shapiro,
Big Data, Genetics, and Re-Identification, BILL OF HEALTH (Sept. 14, 2015)
https://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2015/09/24/big-data-genetics-and-re-identification
[https://perma.cc/P2HD-7K76] (focusing on the re-identification of genetic data); Md Shopon,
Sanjida Nasreen Tumpa, Yajurv Bhatia, K. N. Pavan Kumar & Marina L. Gavrilova, Biometric
Systems De-Identification: Current Advancements and Future Directions, J. CYBERSECURITY &
PRIVACY 470, 470–71 (2021) (focusing on the privacy issues raised by biometric data).
319. See generally Stacey A. Tovino, A Timely Right to Privacy, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1361, 1394
(2019) [hereinafter Tovino, A Timely Right to Privacy] (explaining that certain privacy penalty
sharing regulations, delegated by Congress to HHS with a promulgation deadline of February 17,
2012, have yet to be promulgated by HHS). As of the writing of this Article, these regulations
remain overdue, as they have been for almost ten years.
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A. Evolving Law
The first theoretical alternative to fixed or outdated identification
and de-identification standards is based on the concept of evolving law.
As background, it is important to note that most of the identification
and de-identification standards assessed in Part II are static. At the
time they were written, they specified particular tests or particular data
elements that implicated legal protection or resulted in deregulation,
and these chosen tests or elements have not changed over time. It is
also important to note that de-identification in accordance with the deidentification standards referenced in Part II produces, if anything,
temporary de-identification. After data are de-identified, new external
data may be created. This new data may be linked with the temporarily
de-identified health data to reidentify the data subjects.
The problem with these identification and de-identification
standards is that they neither evolve with the science of data
reidentification nor recognize the temporariness of data deidentification. Although most of the standards could illustrate this
point, consider the eighteen-element HIPAA Safe Harbor,
promulgated through a final rule published on December 28, 2000.320
Although research has shown that data de-identified in accordance
with the Safe Harbor are vulnerable to reidentification,321 HHS has not
updated the Safe Harbor in over two decades.322
Further consider the California Shine the Light Act, signed into
law on September 23, 2003, which protects twenty-seven categories of
personal information.323 The California State Legislature is to be
320. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,818 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i)(A)–(R) (2020))
(promulgating the eighteen-element Safe Harbor that remains in effect as of this writing).
321. See supra notes 64, 66 and accompanying text (reporting 3.2 percent and 10.6 percent
reidentification rates, respectively, with respect to Maine and Vermont discharge data deidentified in accordance with the HIPAA Safe Harbor).
322. This does not mean that HHS necessarily should repeal its Safe Harbor. Research does
show that application of the Safe Harbor can reduce the risk of reidentification. See supra notes
61–66 and accompanying text (reporting that the risk of re-identification of Maine and Vermont
hospital discharge data fell from 28.3 percent to 3.2 percent and 34 percent to 10.6 percent,
respectively, after applying the HIPAA Safe Harbor).
323. California Shine the Light Act, 2003 Cal. Stat. 3891. The categories of personal
information protected under the law are:
(A) An individual’s name and address. (B) Electronic mail address. (C) Age or date of
birth. (D) Names of children. (E) Electronic mail or other addresses of children. (F)
Number of children. (G) The age or gender of children. (H) Height. (I) Weight. (J)
Race. (K) Religion. (L) Occupation. (M) Telephone number. (N) Education. (O)
Political party affiliation. (P) Medical condition. (Q) Drugs, therapies, or medical
products or equipment used. (R) The kind of product the customer purchased, leased,
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commended for including several data elements not commonly
included in other data protection laws, such as race, religion,
occupation, education, political party, and creditworthiness.324 As
noted by the Kaiser Permanente researchers, individuals who are
members of vulnerable populations (such as racial minority groups,
religious minority groups, those in uncommon occupations, small or
independent political parties or groups, and socioeconomically
disadvantaged groups) may bear a disproportionate burden of health
data reidentification.325 That said, the Shine the Light Act’s definition
of personal information could be improved by adding a provision
requiring lawmakers or regulators to periodically review and update
the data elements listed therein.
There is precedent for applying a theory of evolving law to data
protection. For example, the Massachusetts Security Breaches Act
includes the following sentence: “The [Massachusetts Office] of
[C]onsumer [A]ffairs and [B]usiness [R]egulation may adopt
regulations, from time to time, to revise the definition of ‘encrypted’,
as used in this chapter, to reflect applicable technological
advancements.”326 This Article proposes that data protection law
makers consider including similar evolving law language at the
conclusion of their identification and/or de-identification tests or
standards, as appropriate. Options for implementing evolving law
include statutory sunset provisions, which provide for the expiration
(and, therefore, perhaps renewal with amendments reflecting advances
in science) of the law after a certain period of time, as well as provisions
delegating the promulgation of regulations that would update the law
from time to time.

or rented. (S) Real property purchased, leased, or rented. (T) The kind of service
provided. (U) Social security number. (V) Bank account number. (W) Credit card
number. (X) Debit card number. (Y) Bank or investment account, debit card, or credit
card balance. (Z) Payment history. (AA) Information pertaining to creditworthiness,
assets, income, or liabilities.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83(e)(7) (2020); Appendix at California-3.
324. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83(e)(7)(J)–(L), (N)–(O), (AA); Appendix at California-3. But
see Xu & Zhang, supra note 137, at 2–3 (asking “whether data anonymization could mask gross
statistical disparities between [vulnerable] sub-populations in the data” and proposing that certain
mechanisms of data anonymization may do so, which could preclude identification of health
disparities (emphasis omitted)).
325. See supra notes 135–136 and accompanying text (noting that the risk of reidentification
falls “largely or exclusively on those in small cells or classes” such as “vulnerable or . . .
disadvantaged groups” (quoting Simon et al., supra note 20, at 8)).
326. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93H, § 1(b) (West 2021); Appendix at Massachusetts.
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Using the California Shine the Light Act as an example, the
following new statutory provision (in italics) could be added to the end
of current Cal. Civ. Code section 1798.83(e)(7) so that the data
elements selected in 2003 for the definition of “personal information”
keep pace with advances in data reidentification:
(e) For purposes of this section, the following terms have the
following meanings: . . .
(7) “Personal Information” . . . The California Department of
Consumer Affairs shall adopt regulations from time to time
revising the definition of “personal information” to reflect
advances in data identification and/or data reidentification. In
promulgating such regulations, the Department shall consider: (1)
the availability of public, semi-public, or private external data
containing one or more elements that overlap with one or more of
the data elements listed in the definition of “personal information”;
(2) the size of the class defined by those overlapping elements in
which the personal data element(s) fall(s); and (3) the overlap in
the population covered by the personal data element(s) and the
population covered by the external data source(s). See, e.g.,
Gregory E. Simon et al., Assessing and Minimizing Reidentification Risk in Research Data Derived from Health Care
Records, 7(1) EGEMS 1 (2019).

As applied to this California law, an evolving law theory promotes
privacy by instructing lawmakers to become familiar with the
reidentification literature and to consider how such literature impacts
the selection of (or the failure to select) particular data elements for
inclusion in the definition of “personal information.” An evolving law
theory also maintains and supports the concrete prescription of a
multiple data element identification approach, which may help
unsophisticated data custodians’ compliance. One limitation of the
evolving law theory as applied to the California Shine the Light Act is
that it requires an administrative agency to act, which usually, but does
not always, occur.327
B. Reidentification Prohibition
A second theoretical alternative is based on reidentification
prohibition. For background, most of the data protection laws collected
327. Cf. Tovino, A Timely Right to Privacy, supra note 319, at 1394 (explaining that certain
federal privacy penalty sharing regulations remain overdue years after Congress delegated them
to HHS).

TOVINO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

NOT SO PRIVATE

1/19/2022 4:31 PM

1033

and reviewed by this Article include health data identification
standards (which are standards that specify which data will receive
legal protection) and de-identification standards (which are standards
that specify when data loses legal protection). Few laws expressly
prohibit data reidentification. As Professor Daniel Solove notes in a
clever cartoon, the science of health data reidentification has advanced
to the point where it is difficult to eliminate the risk of reidentification
through removing additional data elements.328 Although the focus on
identification and de-identification may have made sense when health
industry privacy schemes, chiefly the HIPAA Privacy Rule, were being
developed in the late 1990s and early 2000s,329 different or additional
theoretical approaches are currently necessary.330
Consider an alternative to data protection law’s current focus on
identification and de-identification. That is, what about a prohibition
against reidentification? There is precedent for the use of a
reidentification prohibition in data protection law in Texas law,331

328. See Daniel Solove, Cartoon: De-Identifying PHI Under HIPAA, PRIV. + SEC. BLOG
(May
18,
2020),
https://teachprivacy.com/cartoon-de-identifying-phi-under-hipaa
[https://perma.cc/D4KQ-JUJP].
329. President Clinton signed HIPAA into law on August 21, 1996. See generally Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat.
1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). As directed by HIPAA,
HHS published its proposed HIPAA Privacy Rule on November 3, 1999, and its final HIPAA
Privacy Rule on December 28, 2000. See generally Standards for Privacy of Individually
Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918, 59,919 (Nov. 3, 1999) (codified at 45 C.F.R.
§§ 160–64); Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462 (Dec. 28, 2000). HHS published proposed and final modifications to the HIPAA Privacy
Rule on March 27, 2002, and August 14, 2002, respectively. See generally Standards for Privacy of
Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg. 14,776 (Mar. 27, 2002) (codified at 45
C.F.R. §§ 160–64); Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed.
Reg. 53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002). The HIPAA Privacy Rule—which, at least before President Obama
signed the ARRA into law, directed additional changes to be made—originated in the time frame
of 1996 to 2002. See supra note 315 (explaining the changes made by ARRA to the HIPAA
Privacy Rule).
330. Although the HIPAA Privacy Rule has its origins in the time frame of 1996 to 2002, see
supra note 329, the health data reidentification studies cited in Part I of this Article were
published in 2010, Loukides et al., supra note 98, 2011, El Emam et al., A Systematic Review, supra
note 86, 2013, El Emam et al., Evaluating the Risk of Patient Re-Identification, supra note 15, 2015,
Sweeney, supra note 7, 2018, Ji Su Yoo et al., supra note 58, 2018, Na et al., supra note 70, and
2019, Simon et al., supra note 20.
331. “A person may not reidentify or attempt to reidentify an individual who is the subject
of any protected health information without obtaining the individual’s consent or authorization
if required under this chapter or other state or federal law.” TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 181.151 (2020); Appendix at Texas-2.
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Arkansas law,332 Hawaii law,333 California law and the CCPA, and a
federal research regulation. In the context of health-care procedure
data submitted by California hospitals to the State of California that
then may be re-shared with submitting hospitals in the form of riskadjusted outcome rates,334 a California law provides: “In no case shall
a hospital, contractor, or subcontractor reidentify or attempt to
reidentify any information received pursuant to this section.”335 The
CCPA as well as recently introduced federal data protection bills that
incorporate a “public commitment plus contractual obligation” deidentification
standard
also
include
prohibitions
against
reidentification.336 Federal human subjects research regulation also
offers precedent for a prohibition against reidentification. A regulation
permits “[s]econdary research uses of identifiable private information
or identifiable biospecimens” when, among other requirements, the
researcher “will not re-identify” the subjects.337
This Article proposes a similar reidentification prohibition that
would apply to all health data. In terms of placing such a prohibition,
note that many current data protection laws have limited applicability.
For example, the HIPAA Privacy Rule only applies to covered entities
and business associates.338 Even if Congress directed HHS to amend
the HIPAA Privacy Rule to include a general prohibition against data
reidentification, the end result would still be that only covered entities
(health plans, health care clearinghouses, and certain health care
providers) and their business associates would be subject to the

332. This Arkansas law establishing an all-payer health insurance claims database prohibits
data in the database from being used to “[r]eidentify or attempt to reidentify an individual who is
the subject of any submitted data without obtaining the individual’s consent.” ARK. CODE ANN.
§ 21-61-907(a)(2)(B) (2020).
333. “Under no circumstances shall a person attempt to re-identify [the] subjects of [health
insurance data submitted to the state health insurance claims database.]” HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 323D-18.5(i) (2020).
334. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 128735-37, 128745, 128748 (West 2021) (requiring
hospitals to disclose a variety of health data to the State of California and requiring the state to
use the data to publish risk-adjusted outcome rates).
335. Id. § 128766(b) (West 2021).
336. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(m)(2) (West 2021) (effective Jan. 1, 2023); Appendix at
California-2; COVID-19 Consumer Data Protection Act of 2020, S. 3663, 116th Cong. § 2(9)(B),
(C), (D) (2020); Appendix at CCDPA; Exposure Notification Privacy Act, S. 3861, 116th Cong.
§ 2(2)(B) (2020); Appendix at ENPA.
337. 45 C.F.R. § 46.104(d)(4)(ii) (2020).
338. See supra notes 148–152 and accompanying text (explaining the limited application of
the “Reasonable Basis to Believe” standard in the HIPAA Privacy Rule).
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prohibition.339 Part I.A shows, however, that patients are concerned
that their data will be reidentified by technology companies,
nonclinical research teams, news reporters, lay community members,
and other non-health industry participants that may use their
information for financial or other personal gain.340
For this reason, this Article prefers (with some modifications) the
approach of the TMRPA. The TMRPA broadly applies to any person
who “comes into possession of” or “obtains or stores” certain
information.341 The TMRPA thus regulates nonhealth industry
participants, including the technology companies and other individuals
and institutions beyond the reach of the HIPAA Privacy Rule.
One limitation of the TMRPA is that the Texas Attorney General
only enforces the law on behalf of Texas residents.342 In response, this
Article proposes a federal statutory prohibition against health data
reidentification that would apply to any individual or any institution
that collects, purchases, obtains, maintains, stores, or otherwise comes
into possession of health data, regardless of the subject’s residency.343
A uniform law adopted by all states, or as many states as possible,
would also serve this purpose.

339. See supra notes 148–152 and accompanying text ; infra Part III.C (showing workaround
involving Congress directing HHS to expand the application of the HIPAA Privacy Rule to nonhealth-industry participants).
340. See supra Part I.A.
341. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.001(b)(2)(B)–(C) (West 2021).
342. About the Attorney General, KEN PAXTON: ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX.,
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/about-office [https://perma.cc/SHV6-PBV2] (noting that
the Attorney General “is focused on protecting Texans and upholding Texas laws”).
343. This proposal is supported (by analogy to the research context) by Nass, Levit & Gostin.
See BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING HEALTH
THROUGH RESEARCH, supra note 30, at 34, 190 (arguing that “unauthorized reidentification of
individuals from DNA sequences, by anyone, should be strictly prohibited” and that “[t]o further
protect privacy, unauthorized reidentification of information that has had direct identifiers
removed should be prohibited by law, and violators should face legal sanctions”). The European
Union (“EU”) has a nonsectoral General Data Protection Regulation that may serve as a model
for this federal (versus state) recommendation. See Regulation 2016/679, of the European
Parliament and of the Council of 27 Apr. 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 22 (establishing a
general regulation to protect individuals from health data reidentification that applies to any
“controller or . . . processor” of personal data). See generally Stacey A. Tovino, The HIPAA
Privacy Rule and the EU GDPR: Illustrative Comparisons, 47 SETON HALL. L. REV. 973 (2017)
(reviewing the non-sectoral GDPR and explaining how it compares to the health industry-specific
HIPAA Privacy Rule); Tovino, supra note 144, at Parts II.A–D (discussing provisions within the
GDPR as applied to mobile health research applications).
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A second limitation of the TMRPA is that the prohibition against
reidentification technically only applies to PHI, which is based on the
definition of individually identifiable health information (“IIHI”).344
IIHI, in turn, is based on whether “there is [a] reasonable basis to
believe” the information can be used to identify an individual.345 To be
effective, a reidentification prohibition must also apply to health
information thought by some not to be identifiable. Otherwise,
adversaries will defend themselves by saying that the prohibition did
not apply to their extraordinary work because there was no ordinary
belief that the information could be used to identify an individual.
The draft text that may be used for a general health data
reidentification prohibition is: “In no case shall any individual or
institution reidentify or attempt to reidentify the subject of any health
data collected, received, purchased, or otherwise obtained by the
individual or institution.” Note that it uses the catchall phrase “health
data,” not “protected health information” or “individually identifiable
health information.” This is intentional. The law must protect
information that some might think is not individually identifiable from
being reidentified. During the legislative committee process, particular
attention should be paid to defining “health data.”346
C. Noncollection
A third theoretical alternative is based on noncollection.
Noncollection refers to a prohibition against gathering, or collecting,
health data by any person other than the data subject without the prior
written notification and/or authorization of the data subject. Some
federal bills and some state laws already incorporate health data

344. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.151 (West 2021).
345. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(a) (2020) (defining non-individually identifying health
information as health information for “which there is no reasonable basis to believe that the
information can be used to identify an individual”).
346. The HIPAA Privacy Rule defines “health information” as
any information, including genetic information, whether oral or recorded in any form
or medium, that: (1) Is created or received by a health care provider, health plan, public
health authority, employer, life insurer, school or university, or health care
clearinghouse; and (2) Relates to the past, present, or future physical or mental health
or condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the past,
present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual.
Id. § 160.103. This Article dislikes the first clause, which is too limiting in terms of who can create
or receive the information for the information to qualify as “health information.” For example,
the first clause does not include technology companies, mobile health applications, nonclinical
research teams, non-university-based research teams, journalists, news reporters, and lay
community members. Instead, this Article recommends the broadly written second clause.
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noncollection principles in some contexts. For example, the newly
introduced federal ITPDCA would require a data controller to notify
an individual “through a privacy and data use policy of a specific
[intent] to collect . . . information” and to give the individual the right
and ability to opt-out of such collection.347 The privacy and data use
policy would be required to include, among other notifications, (1) the
“[i]dentity and contact information of the entity collecting” the
individual’s personal information; (2) the purpose, or reason why, the
entity wants to collect the individual’s personal information; and (3)
“[t]he process by which individuals may withdraw [their] consent to the
collect[ion of their] personal information.”348
As of this writing, the ITPDCA has not been signed into law.349 In
addition, federal regulations like the HIPAA Privacy Rule and some
state statutes like the TMRPA only regulate the use, disclosure, and
sale of health data, not the collection of health data.350 Because
individuals voluntarily give significant health data to health industry
participants, especially health care providers, while obtaining health
care, prohibiting providers from generally collecting health data would
not make sense unless the collection prohibition exempted diagnostic
and treatment purposes. That said, prohibiting non-health-care
providers, including mobile health applications, wearable devices, and
infectious disease ENS, from collecting an individual’s health data (as
well as general consumer data from which health may be inferred)
without the individual’s prior notification and authorization does make
sense.
D. Nonuse and Nondisclosure
This Article recommends evolving law, non-reidentification, and
noncollection to reduce the vulnerability of health data to
reidentification, to prohibit reidentification, and to reduce the amount

347. Information Transparency & Personal Data Control Act, H.R. 1816, 117th Cong.
§ 3(a)(1)(A), (4)(A) (2021); Appendix at ITPDCA.
348. H.R. 1816 § 3(a)(3)(A)–(D); Appendix at ITPDCA.
349. H.R.1816 - Information Transparency & Personal Data Control Act, CONGRESS.GOV,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/1816/actions [https://perma.cc/2Z2VBHDZ] (showing that the ITPDCA was introduced on March 11, 2021, but has not been enacted).
350. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502–164.514 (2020) (codifying the HIPAA Privacy Rule’s “uses and
disclosures” requirements and not setting forth any “collection” prohibitions); TEX. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.152 (West 2021) (regulating marketing uses and disclosures of
protected health information); id. § 181.153 (regulating “[s]ale[s] of [p]rotected [h]ealth
[i]nformation”); Appendix at Texas-2.

TOVINO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

1/19/2022 4:31 PM

1038

[Vol. 71:985

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

of data that may be reidentified, respectively. Nonuse and
nondisclosure would provide checks and balances should incorporating
evolving law or non-reidentification provisions be limited or fail.
Nonuse is the prohibition of the use351 of health data, including
reidentified health data, by any person other than the data subject
without the subject’s prior written authorization. Nondisclosure is the
prohibition of the disclosure352 of health data, including reidentified
health data, by any person other than the data subject without the
subject’s prior written authorization.
Federal and state health laws already incorporate nonuse and
nondisclosure principles in some contexts. For example, the federal
HIPAA Privacy Rule prohibits covered entities and business associates
from using or disclosing a patient’s PHI unless the patient has given
prior written authorization or the use or disclosure falls into an
exception.353 Similarly, the TMRPA prohibits any person who “comes
into possession of” or “obtains or stores” PHI354 from (1) “disclos[ing]
an individual’s [PHI] . . . in exchange for direct or indirect
remuneration” (i.e., selling an individual’s PHI)355 or (2)
“electronically disclos[ing] an individual’s [PHI] to any person without
a separate[, prior] authorization from the individual . . . for each
disclosure.”356 Nonuse and nondisclosure laws like the HIPAA Privacy
Rule are premised on findings that health data subjects are concerned
about how their information is used and how their information may be
later transmitted or disclosed.357 At the time that HHS was drafting the
1999 proposed HIPAA Privacy Rule, a contemporaneous Wall Street
351. See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (defining “use” as “the sharing, employment, application,
utilization, examination, or analysis of such information within an entity that maintains such
information”).
352. See, e.g., id. (defining “disclosure” as “the release, transfer, provision of access to, or
divulging in any manner of information outside the entity holding the information”).
353. Id. § 164.508(a)(1), (b)(1)(i).
354. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.001(b)(2)(B)–(C) (West 2021) (defining a
“[c]overed entity”).
355. Id. § 181.153(a).
356. Id. § 181.154(b).
357. In the Department of Health and Human Services’ Federal Register notice proposing
the HIPAA Privacy Rule, the agency noted,
Individuals who provide information to health care providers and health plans
increasingly are concerned about how their information is used within the health care
system. Patients want to know that their sensitive information will be protected not
only during the course of their treatment but also in the future as that information is
maintained and/or transmitted within and outside of the health care system.
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59,918, 59,919
(Nov. 3, 1999) (codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160–64).
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Journal poll showed that 29 percent of respondents cited “[l]oss of
personal privacy” as a first or second response to the question of “what
concerned them most in the coming century.”358 Other concerns,
including “terrorism, . . . war, and global warming,” received first or
second responses at 23 percent or less.359
Nonuse and nondisclosure laws are also premised on findings
showing that patients preemptively respond to concerns about loss of
privacy by (1) lying about (or minimizing) their symptoms, healthrelated behaviors, and/or health conditions when seeking care; (2)
visiting multiple health care providers to avoid shame associated with
repeated unhealthy behaviors and the documentation thereof; and (3)
refusing to seek health care altogether.360 HHS explained that it
designed the 1999 proposed rule to respond to these privacy concerns:
“The use of these standards will help to restore patient confidence in
the health care system, providing benefits to both patients and those
who serve them.”361
Nonuse and nondisclosure laws are further premised on findings
showing that an increasing number of individuals and institutions were
becoming involved in the collection, use, disclosure, and redisclosure
of health data. The 1999 proposed rule stated: “The number of entities
who are maintaining and transmitting individually identifiable health
information has increased significantly over the last 10 years.”362 The
same statement could be made today, more than two decades later.
Technology companies, nonclinical researchers, journalists, and lay
community members are increasingly acquiring, using, and sharing
health information—sometimes to the ridicule, shame, detriment,
embarrassment, or unwanted publicity of the data subjects and their
families.363 Whereas health information used to be created, used, and

358. Id. (referencing Wall Street Journal poll).
359. Id.
360. Id. at 59,920 (referencing a California HealthCare Foundation survey reporting that
“one-sixth of respondents indicated that they had taken some form of action to avoid the misuse
of their information, including providing inaccurate information, frequently changing physicians,
or avoiding care”).
361. Id.; see also BEYOND THE HIPAA PRIVACY RULE: ENHANCING PRIVACY, IMPROVING
HEALTH THROUGH RESEARCH, supra note 30, at 57, 59, 60, 65, 83–84 (explaining that some
individuals do not participate in research because of privacy and confidentiality concerns as well
as a lack of trust in researchers).
362. Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 64 Fed. Reg. at
59,920.
363. See, e.g., Park et al., supra note 16, at 2129 (describing members of the South Korean
public reidentifying COVID-19 data, resulting in some reidentified people being “affected by
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disclosed within the somewhat closed loop of the health-care delivery
and health insurance industries, the story is quite different today.364
Unfortunately, both the HIPAA Privacy Rule and the TMRPA
are limited in application. As mentioned earlier, the HIPAA Privacy
Rule only applies to certain health industry participants and their
business associates.365 Although the TMRPA technically applies to
anyone who comes into possession of, or collects or stores, protected
health information,366 the law is enforced only on behalf of Texas
residents.367 This Article therefore proposes that Congress direct HHS
to (1) expand the application of the HIPAA Administrative
Simplification rules (of which the HIPAA Privacy Rule is one part)368
to anyone who comes into possession of, collects, or stores PHI or
reidentified health data and (2) apply the nonuse and nondisclosure
provisions within the HIPAA Privacy Rule to such newly regulated
persons and to such data. The result would be that anyone who comes
into possession of, collects, or stores PHI or reidentified data would be
prohibited from using or disclosing that data without the data subject’s
prior written authorization. To achieve this result, the following new
statutory language (in italics) should be added to the end of § 1320d1(a) of Title 42 of the U.S. Code as follows:
(a) Applicability. Any standard adopted under this part shall apply,
in whole or in part, to the following persons:

unwanted privacy invasion” and facing “public disdain”); El Emam et al., Evaluating the Risk of
Patient Re-Identification, supra note 15, at 1 (reporting a journalist’s reidentification of a twentysix-year-old woman from a de-identified adverse event database, and noting that the woman died
while taking a particular medication and the journalist subsequently contacted her family and
broadcasted the unfortunate story).
364. See, e.g., Tovino, supra note 144, at 208 (explaining that, “a quarter of a century ago, . . .
most data originated in the industry to which it pertained”; that is, health data originated and
stayed within the offices of health care providers, not technology companies like Google; arguing
for more generally applicable forms of data protection rather than industry-specific laws to
respond to the increasing number of non-health-industry participants who collect, use, and
disclose health data).
365. See supra notes 149–150 and accompanying text (explaining the application of the
HIPAA Privacy Rule).
366. TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.001(b)(2)(B)–(C) (West 2021).
367. See KEN PAXTON: ATT’Y GEN. OF TEX., supra note 342 (“Attorney General Paxton is
focused on protecting Texans and upholding Texas laws and the Constitution.”).
368. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.500–164.534 (2020) (codifying the HIPAA Privacy Rule, which is
one part of the Administrative Simplification Rules codified at 45 C.F.R. §§ 160.101–164.534).
The HIPAA Administrative Simplification Rules also include a security rule and a breach
notification rule. See generally supra note 143 (citing to the HIPAA Security Rule); 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.410 (2020) (codifying the HIPAA Breach Notification Rule).
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(1) A health plan.
(2) A health care clearinghouse.
(3) A health care provider who transmits any health information
in electronic form in connection with a transaction referred to in
section 1320d-2(a)(1) of this title.
(4) Any other natural or legal person who comes into possession
of, or collects or stores, health data.

The bill should also direct the Secretary of HHS to promulgate
regulations within six months of the date of enactment of the bill
making conforming changes to the HIPAA Administrative
Simplification Rules. Illustrative, not exhaustive, examples of
conforming regulatory changes would expand the definition of
“[c]overed entity”369 as well as expand the application of the
Administrative Simplification Rules.370 To the extent Congress does
not enact such a bill, this Article recommends a uniform state law based
on the TMRPA as next best.
E. Nondiscrimination
A sixth and final approach is necessary to minimize informational
injuries to health data subjects: nondiscrimination. In this context,
nondiscrimination refers to prohibiting undesirable discrimination
against an individual based on the individual’s health data by any
person or institution.
A range of health laws already incorporate principles of
nondiscrimination. For example, one portion of the Genetic
Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008 (“GINA”)prohibits health
insurers from using genetic information about an individual to adjust a
group plan’s premiums, or, for individual plans, to deny coverage,
adjust premiums, or impose a preexisting condition exclusion.371 One
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) provision prohibits “group health
plan[s] and . . . health insurance issuer[s] offering group or individual
health insurance coverage [from] establish[ing] rules for [enrollment]

369. 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
370. Id. §§ 160.102(a), 164.104(a). Additional changes to the HIPAA Statute and
Administrative Simplification Rules recommended by the Author in prior works, including those
relating to a qui tam process and a private right of action, would further support the arguments
made in this Article. See, e.g., Tovino, A Timely Right to Privacy, supra note 319, at Parts IV–V.
371. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, §§ 101(a),
102(b), 122 Stat. 881, 883, 893.
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eligibility” based on a long list of overlapping items, including health
status, medical condition, claims experience, “[r]eceipt of health care,”
medical history, genetic information, evidence of insurability,
disability, and “[a]ny other health status-related factor determined
appropriate by the Secretary” of HHS.372
These illustrative nondiscrimination provisions are limited in
application, however. Neither the GINA provision nor the ACA
provision applies to disability insurers, life insurers, or long-term care
insurers.373 To understand why this regulatory gap is problematic,
consider the fact that racial and ethnic minorities are
disproportionately represented among confirmed COVID-19 cases,
372. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(a). Although some state laws do apply to other forms of insurance,
these state laws are in the minority. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7(2)–(3) (2021)
(prohibiting “entit[ies] that provide[] group disability insurance” from using information from
genetic tests for nontherapeutic or underwriting purposes); see also Yann Joly, Charles Dupras,
Miriam Pinkesz, Stacey A. Tovino & Mark A. Rothstein, Looking Beyond GINA: Policy
Approaches To Address Genetic Discrimination, 21 ANN. REV. GENOMICS & HUM. GENETICS
491, 495–96 (2020) (stating that a minority of state laws (approximately 25 percent, 20 percent,
and 10 percent, respectively) prohibit genetic discrimination “in the context of disability
insurance,” life insurance, and long-term care insurance).
373. See, e.g., Genetic Discrimination, NAT’L HUM. GENOME RSCH. INST.,
https://www.genome.gov/about-genomics/policy-issues/Genetic-Discrimination [https://perma.cc/X6UGZKRJ] (explaining that because GINA does not apply to disability insurers, life insurers, or longterm care insurers, some states have passed laws that do cover the insurers); 42 U.S.C. § 300gg4(a) (only regulating health plans and health insurance issuers, not disability insurers, life insurers,
or long-term care insurers). Disability nondiscrimination law, such as the Americans with
Disabilities Act and section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), also must be analyzed to
determine the extent to which individuals may be discriminated against in the context of insurance
on the basis of data recording a disability. For example, as the Ninth Circuit stated in Schmitt v.
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan of Washington,
Section 1557 of the [ACA] . . . prohibits covered health insurers from discriminating
based on various grounds, including disability. Prior to the ACA’s enactment, an
insurer could generally design plans to offer or exclude benefits as it saw fit without
violating federal antidiscrimination law—in particular, the Rehabilitation Act—so long
as the insurer did not discriminate against disabled people in providing treatment for
whatever conditions it chose to cover. The primary issue before us is whether the
ACA’s nondiscrimination mandate imposes any constraints on a health insurer’s
selection of plan benefits. We hold that it does.
965 F.3d 945, 948 (9th Cir. 2020); see, e.g., Valarie Blake, Rethinking the Americans with
Disabilities Act’s Insurance Safe Harbor, 6 LAWS 1, 1 (2017) (explaining that an ADA safe harbor
“explicitly permits insurers to discriminate on the basis of disability in health insurance so long as
the differential treatment is supported by actuarial data and is not just intended to disadvantage
the disabled” and arguing for the removal of the safe harbor). More recent nondiscrimination
laws also must be considered. For example, one provision within the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act prohibits entities from “discriminat[ing] against . . . individual[s] on the
basis of information received . . . pursuant to an inadvertent or intentional disclosure of
[substance use disorder] records,” including in the health care and employment contexts.
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 3221(g), 134 Stat.
281, 377–78 (2020) (codified at 42 USC § 290dd-2(i)(1)).
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hospitalizations, long-haul symptoms, and deaths.374 As a result, racial
and ethnic minorities are disproportionately represented among
recorded COVID-19 data that are undesirable from the perspective of
disability insurers, life insurers, and long-term care insurers.375 Thus,
these vulnerable populations may have greater difficulty obtaining the
financial security associated with these forms of insurance, further
reinforcing the socioeconomic determinants of health that contributed
to higher rates of COVID-19 to begin with.376 Disadvantage is then
heaped upon disadvantage because individuals who are members of
racial and ethnic minority groups also bear a disproportionate burden
of data reidentification.377
For these reasons, this Article joins the chorus of health law
scholars who have written extensively about the concerns associated

374. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., HHS INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS THE
DISPARATE IMPACT OF COVID-19 ON AFRICAN AMERICANS AND OTHER RACIAL AND ETHNIC
MINORITIES 2 (2020) (noting that the CDC data show higher hospitalizations of African
Americans for COVID-19); COVID-19 in Racial and Ethnic Minority Groups, U.S. CTRS. FOR
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://stacks.cdc.gov/view/cdc/89820/cdc_89820_DS1.pdf?
[https://perma.cc/6ECD-6RM2] (“Long-standing systemic health and social inequities have put
some members of racial and ethnic minority groups at increased risk of getting COVID-19 or
experiencing severe illness, regardless of age.”); Rachel R. Hardeman, Eduardo M. Medina &
Rhea W. Boyd, Stolen Breaths, 383 NEW ENG. J. MED. 197, 197 (2020) (“In Minnesota, . . . [B]lack
Americans account for 6% of the population but 14% of Covid-19 cases and 33% of Covid-19
deaths . . . .”); Khiara M. Bridges, The Many Ways Institutional Racism Kills Black People, TIME
(June
11,
2020,
6:31
AM),
https://time.com/5851864/institutional-racism-america
[https://perma.cc/F28H-KZBL] (“COVID-19 has disproportionately killed [B]lack people in the
U.S.”); Kyle Yomogida, Sophie Zhu, Francesca Rubino, Wilma Figueroa, Nora Balanji & Emily
Holman, Post-Acute Sequelae of SARS-CoV-2 Infection Among Adults Aged ≥18 Years — Long
Beach, California, April 1–December 10, 2020, 70 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1274,
1277 (2021) (reporting higher rates of post-acute sequelae among Black persons). See generally
Ruqaiijah Yearby & Seema Mohapatra, Law, Structural Racism, and the COVID-19 Pandemic, 7
J.L. & BIOSCIENCES, Jan.–June 2020, at 1 (explaining how employment, housing, health care, and
COVID-19 relief laws have been manipulated to disadvantage racial and ethnic minorities,
making them more susceptible to COVID-19 infection and death).
375. See, e.g., AM. ACAD. OF ACTUARIES, ISSUE BRIEF: THE USE OF GENETIC
INFORMATION IN DISABILITY INCOME AND LONG-TERM CARE INSURANCE 2–3 (2002)
(discussing medical underwriting in the contexts of disability insurance and long-term care
insurance and noting that both physical and mental health conditions are major causes of
insurance claims).
376. See, e.g., Emily A. Benfer & Lindsay F. Wiley, Health Justice Strategies To Combat
COVID-19: Protecting Vulnerable Communities During a Pandemic, HEALTH AFFS. BLOG (Mar.
19, 2020), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20200319.757883/full [https://perma.cc/
3MW7-5PQP] (citing recent census report showing that “communities of color and low-income
neighborhoods” have more concentrated poverty risk and that “[m]any low-income individuals
and families face significant challenges that prevent them from protecting themselves and others
from COVID-19”).
377. See supra notes 135–137 and accompanying text.
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with health status (and underlying health data) discrimination and
argues strongly against undesirable forms of discrimination against
health data subjects.378 This Article also supports the scholars who
promote universal health insurance.379 Universal access regimes
prohibit or limit discrimination based on health status and therefore
health data, making health data less consequential.380 Decreased
consequence may, in turn, decrease efforts to collect, reidentify, use, or
disclose health data.
CONCLUSION
This Article carefully reviews health data reidentification claims
and concerns, providing specific examples of de-identified health data
that were reidentified following matching with other public,
semipublic, or private data. This Article also reviews the scientific
literature assessing the risk of reidentification and the efficacy of
particular de-identification techniques. Four conclusions result: First,
health data have a high reidentification risk. Second, health data from
which as many as eighteen different identifiers have been removed still
carry some reidentification risk. Third, two popular data perturbation
techniques—suppressing rare data elements and generalizing other
data elements—do not always prevent reidentification. Finally, data
subjects do not equally share reidentification risk. Vulnerable
individuals, including individuals with rare health conditions and
individuals in racial and ethnic minority groups, bear a
disproportionate burden of reidentification.
To determine whether the law recognizes these reidentification
risks and burdens and appropriately responds, this Article collects and
originally synthesizes a wide range of illustrative current and pending
federal and state laws that expressly or potentially protect health data’s
confidentiality and security as well as data subjects’ privacy.
Inexhaustive examples of the types of health data protected by the

378. See, e.g., JESSICA L. ROBERTS & ELIZABETH WEEKS, HEALTHISM: HEALTH-STATUS
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 180–97 (2018) (explaining the difference between desirable
health status differentiation and undesirable health status discrimination).
379. See, e.g., Nicolas P. Terry & Christine Coughlin, A Virtuous Circle: How Health
Solidarity Could Prompt Recalibration of Privacy and Improve Data and Research, 74 OKLA. L.
REV. 51, 52 (2021) (“[I]f health care continues to robustly prohibit health discrimination and
continues to grow closer to universal access, the need for health data protection should decrease.
This decrease would result not because privacy declines as a value but because exposures of health
information would be less consequential.”).
380. See id. at 77.
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collected legal authorities include general medical record data,
physical health condition data, mental health condition data, health
insurance data, infectious disease data, suicide risk data, health and
fitness data, genetic data, biometric data, biological samples,
prescription data, geolocation data, and proximity data, as well as
general consumer data from which health can be inferred. This Article
identifies a number of significant weaknesses associated with the
identification and de-identification standards reviewed that render
both unprotected data and formally de-identified data vulnerable to
reidentification.
To protect against the reidentification risks and disproportionate
reidentification burdens described in this Article and to respond to
calls for data de-identification reform, this Article proposes six
theoretical alternatives to the current focus on identification and deidentification. These alternatives are based on the concepts of evolving
law, non-reidentification, noncollection, nonuse, nondisclosure, and
nondiscrimination. This Article also offers specific textual
amendments to federal and state data protection laws that would
incorporate these theoretical alternatives. If adopted by federal and
state lawmakers, this Article’s proposals will help protect health data
subjects from discrimination and other informational injuries
associated with the use, disclosure, and redisclosure of their
identifiable—and potentially reidentifiable—health data.

